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ARTICLE
DATA SCAMS
Roger Allan Ford*
ABSTRACT

Targeting platforms like Google and Facebook are usually
seen as presenting tradeoffs between utility and privacy. This
Article identifies and describes a different, non-privacy cost of
targeting platforms: they make it easier for malicious actors to
scam others. They do this by making it easier for scammers to
reach the most promising victims, hide from law-enforcement
authorities and others, and develop better scams. Technology
offers potential solutions, since the same data and targeting tools
that enable scams could help detect and prevent them, though
neither platforms nor law-enforcement officials have both the
incentives and expertise needed to develop and deploy those
solutions. Moreover, these scams may illustrate a broader class of
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problems from targeting that go beyond utility versus privacy,
suggesting that more aggressive interventions may be needed.
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INTRODUCTION

In the course of the historically strange 2016 presidential
election, one of the stranger subplots came in the form of a political
action committee called the American Horizons PAC, which
purported to support Donald Trump.1 The PAC, created by

1.

Shane Goldmacher, Meet the Man Siphoning Money from Donald Trump,

POLITICO (Aug. 29, 2016, 5:25 AM), http://politico.com/story/2016/08/donald-trump-fundrai
ser-hawes-227486 [https://perma.cc/AY48-KM2J].
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twenty-five-year-old Ian Hawes, raised more than $1.1 million in
2016 by offering donors the chance to win a "Dinner with Donald
Trump" if they signed up at dinnerwithtrump.org. As the fine print
explained, this meant that the PAC would buy the winner two
tickets to a Trump fundraiser. The PAC could offer little more:
though its website looked eerily like the Trump campaign's, and
though many donors thought they were giving to the campaign,
the two groups were entirely unaffiliated. Of the $1.1 million the
group raised, it spent only $31,000 supporting the Trump
campaign-and even that much might be doubted, since much of
2
the money was spent through a company owned by Hawes.
Scam PACs and other organizations have been around for a
long time; a certain kind of low-end political organization has long
used direct mail to raise money, much of which is used, in turn, for
further fundraising. 3 But American Horizons represented an
innovative escalation of these efforts. Instead of painstakingly
building a donor list or purchasing an expensive premade list from
a broker, American Horizons bought Facebook ads-$108,000 of
them in just three weeks. 4 Because Facebook had already done the
work to identify likely Trump supporters and made that
conclusion available to advertisers through its platform, American

American Horizons' FEC filings report that $26,000 out of $31,000 in Trump2.
supporting independent expenditures were made with CartSoft, LLC. AMERICAN HORIZONS
PAC, FEC FORM 3X: REPORT OF RECEIPTS AND DISBURSEMENTS 1-4, 33 (Oct. 26, 2016)
[hereinafter AMERICAN HORIZONS PAC, OCTOBER FEC FORM 3X], https://docquery.fec.gov/
[https://perma.cc/KM5L-QH3S];
pdf/999/201610269034584999/201610269034584999.pdf
AMERICAN HORIZONS PAC, FEC FORM 3X: REPORT OF RECEIPTS AND DISBURSEMENTS 1-4,
37-38 (Dec. 8, 2016) [hereinafter AMERICAN HORIZONS PAC, DECEMBER9 7 FEC FORM 3X],
5.pdf [https://pe
https://docquery.fec.gov/pdf/975/201612089039945975/201612089039945
rma.ccl3YUP-6FX8]. Politico reports that Hawes owns CartSoft. Goldmacher, supra note 1.
On top of the $26,000 spent supporting Trump's campaign, the PAC's filings also report
more than $392,000 in operating expenses spent with CartSoft, for "payment software
development" and "campaign strategy consulting." AMERICAN HORIZONS PAC, OCTOBER
FEC FORM 3X, supra, at 168.
E.g., Kenneth P. Vogel, The Rise of 'Scam PACs,' POLITICO (Jan. 26, 2015, 5:35
3.
AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/01/super-pac-scams-114581 [https://perma.cc/EU
69-Y7FK] ("Since the tea party burst onto the political landscape in 2009, the conservative
movement has been plagued by an explosion of PACs that critics say exist mostly to pad
the pockets of the consultants who run them. ... [The PACs plow most of their cash back
into payments to consulting firms for additional fundraising efforts."); see also RICK
WILSON, EVERYTHING TRUMP TOUCHES DIES 4-5 (2018) ("If I'd been truly amoral, I could
have easily spun up a ScamPAC called Americans Making America Great Again American
Eagle Patriot Trump Brigade for Freedom Build the Wall Anti-Sharia PAC.
AMAGAAEPTBFFBTWAS PAC would have dropped a few million fundraising emails to
the obviously enormous ocean of credulous boobs who click 'Donate' at the sign of a red hat
and a sparkly eagle gif, and watched the donations roll in. I could have my volcano lair by
now.").
4.

Goldmacher, supra note 1.
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Horizons could quickly and efficiently show its ads to many of the
most promising potential contributors.
In one sense, this use of targeting is nothing new. Advertisers
have always looked for ways to find the most promising audiences
for their ads, whether by advertising in venues favored by
preferred demographics or by sending targeted direct mail or email to consumers thought to be likely customers.5 New data tools
and techniques make this process more efficient and might allow
advertisers to find new ways to target and manipulate customers, 6
but the goal of advertising goods and services to consumers
remains the same. The ends, though, are different: just as data
makes it easier, cheaper, and more efficient to sell goods and
services, it makes it easier, cheaper, and more efficient to defraud
consumers, sell worthless products, and commit all kinds of lowand high-level scams.7
This Article considers the implications of modern data tools
and techniques-widespread use of data analytics, datasets of
consumer information, and online targeting platforms-for scams
like the American Horizons PAC. Traditional advertising can be
socially valuable when it educates and informs consumers and
helps match them with useful goods and services. 8 Much of the
5.

See infra Section II.B.

6.

See, e.g., SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM 282-90

(2019); Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995, 1003-18
(2014); Daniel Susser et al., Online Manipulation: Hidden Influences in a Digital World 2429 (Dec. 23, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstr
actid=3306006 [https://perma.cc/7Q6H-V7NU].
7.
I use "scams" in a broad sense not dictated by the law, though many scams will
be illegal. See infra Section III.A (developing a definition of "scam" in which a perpetrator
takes advantage of a victim, regardless of the legality of the scam). American Horizons, for
instance, may not have done anything illegal; the fine print on its website explained exactly
what it was offering, and it appears to have complied with the FEC's reporting
requirements for political action committees. It also refunded many contributions upon
requests from donors. The Trump campaign, for what it's worth, accused American
Horizons of fraud, but doesn't seem to have done anything more than send a cease-anddesist letter and file a statement with the FEC explaining that the two entities are
unrelated. See Shane Goldmacher, Trump CampaignDemands 'Dinnerwith Thump' Super
PAC Cease and Desist, POLITICO (Aug. 29, 2016, 6:40 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2
016/08/trump-campaign-super-pac-dinner-227520 [https://perma.cclWFT2-FBD8]; DONALD
J. TRUMP FOR PRESIDENT, INC., FEC FORM 99 (Aug. 29, 2016), https://docquery.fec.gov/pdf
/861/ 2 0 1 608299023756861/201608299023756861.pdf [https://perma.cc/3VJ9-VDJQ]. But
American Horizons' strategy appears to be designed primarily to benefit Hawes and his
companies rather than the Trump campaign, since many of Horizons' expenses were routed
through those companies and little of its spending even purported to benefit the Trump
campaign. American Horizons did this by falsely convincing at least some contributors that
they were directly helping the Trump campaign, not an unrelated PAC. See Goldmacher,
supra note 1 (reporting that out of eleven contributors that Politico was able to reach, all
believed they were giving to the Trump campaign).
8.
See infra Section II.A.
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literature on targeted advertising considers the tradeoffs between
efficiency gains from better consumer targeting and the privacy
costs of that targeting.9 With scams, though, there is no argument
for socially valuable targeting, since the goods and services being
1 0 Yet targeting
marketed are themselves socially harmful.
platforms facilitate these scams by making three things easier and
cheaper: finding the most promising victims, avoiding detection by
law-enforcement agencies and others, and developing the most
effective and persuasive scams. When targeting platforms
facilitate scams, there is no privacy-efficiency tradeoff; instead,
the better the targeting, the worse it is for society."
There are interventions that could help solve these problems,
but they are difficult to implement and would bring their own
problems. A naive solution would be to ban targeted advertising,
but such a rule is politically unviable and would impose significant
costs. A better approach might be to use the same datasets and
analytics tools that enable targeting to help expose scams by
2
revealing patterns characteristic of scammers.1 The critical
question is how the government could encourage the development
of tools to reveal these patterns. Platforms could give lawenforcement agencies access to the necessary data, but agencies
may not be competent to use the data, and giving them this access
13
would create new privacy problems. Platform developers could
instead do some of the work themselves, since they likely have the
needed expertise in their own platforms and in analyzing complex
data. Platforms lack strong incentives to detect scams, though,
because scams can increase platform profits and since federal law
14
makes it difficult to compel platforms to help. Giving platforms
incentives to detect scams, then, while providing officials access to
enough data to enforce the law while not compromising users'
privacy, requires a careful regulatory balance.
This analysis has important implications for policy makers
and scholars of privacy and targeting technologies. Data scams
have their roots in aggregated personal information, but their
harms are not obviously privacy harms, since they don't stem from
the disclosure of personal information. And they're not alone in
this anomaly. Targeting platforms create several kinds of non-

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

See infra Section II.B.
See infra Section IIIA.
See infra Section III.B.
See infra Section IV.A.
See infra Section IV.B.
See infra Section IV.C.
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privacy harms in the consumer marketplace and the democratic
system. Yet platforms do not often bear the costs of these harms,
suggesting a need for regulation. Moreover, if the benefits of
targeting are smaller than they seem-a plausible conclusion from
the limited available evidence-then perhaps the naive solution of
an outright ban on targeting has something to recommend it.15
The rest of this Article proceeds as follows. Part II provides
background, briefly reviewing the economic debate on the social
value of advertising and the literature on privacy and targeted
advertising. Part III extends this literature into the realm of scams
and other forms of socially harmful targeting, arguing that the
targeting techniques discussed in Part II make it easier for
scammers to target victims and harder for law-enforcement
agencies to detect and prevent these scams. Part IV discusses ways
that technology could be used to address the problem of data
scams, how law-enforcement agencies and platforms could be
encouraged to develop those technologies, and difficulties in
implementing each approach. Part V discusses implications.
II

TARGETED ADVERTISING

Perpetuators of data scams use the same forms of targeted
advertising that legitimate sellers use to market their goods and
services. This Part provides a brief overview of these targeted
advertising tools, first discussing advertising more generally and
then discussing how data analytics, consumer datasets, and
targeting platforms permit more efficient advertising. Because
advertising by legitimate firms is well entrenched and, arguably,
welfare-enhancing, the solution to data scams is unlikely to be
simply to eliminate these forms of advertising.' 6
A.

The Social Value of Advertising

For a ubiquitous feature of modern life, advertising presents
some surprisingly difficult economic puzzles. In a world of perfect
competition, advertising would be pure waste, but firms
nevertheless spend half a trillion dollars a year advertising their
products.1 7 Economists have long asked, then, what effects

15.
16.
17.

See infra Part V.
But see infra Part V.
E.g., Global Ad Spending Growth to Double This Year, EMARKETER (July 9, 2014),

https://www.emarketer.com/Article/Global-Ad-Spending-Growth-Double-This-Year/1O109
97 [https://perma.cc/MZ6L-44SS] (reporting that advertisers were expected to spend
$545.40 billion worldwide on advertising in 2014).
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advertising has on consumers and whether those effects are
socially valuable.1 8
In general, three theories have been proposed about how
advertising affects consumers. 19 The first theory asserts that
advertising persuades consumers, such as by altering their
demand for an advertiser's products or creating loyalty to the
advertised brands. 20 The second theory asserts that advertising
informs consumers by providing information that reduces
consumers' search costs. This can be information about the
product (such as pricing or specifications) or indirect information
that signals something about the advertiser or product (such as
21
that the company has money to spend on advertising). And the
third theory asserts that advertising complements the advertised

18.

See generally Kyle Bagwell, The Economic Analysis of Advertising, in 3

HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 1701 (Mark Armstrong & Robert H. Porter eds.,

2007); John Philip Jones, The Economic Effects ofAdvertising: How Research Can Untangle
Them, in THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ADVERTISING RESEARCH 51 (Hong Cheng ed.,

2014), for useful overviews of the economic literature on advertising.
See Bagwell, supra note 18, at 1708-24.
19.
See id. at 1710-16. Some of the key works in the development of the persuasion
20.
theory include WILLIAM S. COMANOR & THOMAS A. WILSON, ADVERTISING AND MARKET

POWER 41-63 (1974) (reviewing theory and evidence suggesting that advertising can be a
significant source of barriers to entry in consumer-product industries due to brand loyalty
and other factors consistent with the persuasion theory); JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE
AFFLUENT SOCIETY 155--56 (1958) (arguing that advertising and sales create demand for
products and that "the manufacturing of demand for the product" is as important, or more
important, to businesses as the manufacturing of the product itself); VANCE PACKARD, THE
HIDDEN PERSUADERS 3-5 (1957) (arguing that advertisers prey on consumers' psychological
vulnerabilities to create new desires and persuade them to buy goods); Dorothea
Braithwaite, The Economic Effects of Advertisement, 38 ECON. J. 16, 17-23 (1928)
(considering advertising as a "selling cost" that shifts consumer demand but might also
provide economies of scale that reduce prices for consumers); Nicholas Kaldor, The
Economic Aspects of Advertising, 18 REV. ECON. STUD. 1, 4-5, 7, 13-15 (1950) (concluding
that although advertising can inform or persuade, most is likely intended to persuade given
the advertiser is an interested party and also developing the argument that advertising
increases industry concentration due to scale economies).
See Bagwell, supranote 18, at 1716-20. Some of the key works in the informative
21.
theory include Phillip Nelson, Advertising as Information, 82 J. POL. ECON. 729 (1974)
(exploring different ways that advertising can provide information about search goods and
experience goods); S.A. Ozga, Imperfect Markets Through Lack ofKnowledge, 74 Q.J. ECON.
29, 39-40 (1960) (proposing that diminishing returns from advertising arise because the
more people that see an ad, the greater the fraction of people who have already received its
information, and so the greater the fraction of subsequent advertising dollars that are
wasted); George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213, 223-24
(1961) (developing a model of consumer behavior in response to dispersed prices and
arguing that advertising serves as a source of pricing information that reduces price
dispersion, reducing retailer margins and benefiting consumers); Lester G. Telser,
Advertising and Competition, 72 J. POL. ECON. 537, 541-51 (1964) (finding evidence that
advertising can facilitate market entry by giving consumers information about new
products).
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goods or services, such as by creating a perception of luxury that
consumers of an expensive product desire. 22
There is likely some truth in each of these stories, but the
problem is that they lead to inconsistent conclusions. 23 The
optimistic case for advertising largely derives from the second
theory, that advertising informs consumers and reduces their
search costs. 2 4 Advertising provides several forms of information.
The most direct form consists of facts about the advertised goods
and services, like product features and pricing. 2 5 Such information
is socially valuable because it helps consumers find better and
cheaper products and because it forces companies to compete to
produce and sell those products, reducing margins. Without this
information, some consumers would pay higher prices, and others
would buy products without features they would otherwise want,
in both cases out of ignorance of better options. And without the
ability to tell consumers about their products, new entrants to a
market would have a hard time competing with established
sellers. But advertising also provides several kinds of indirect
information. 26 The simple fact that a firm advertises suggests a
degree of corporate health, suggesting that the firm is likely to be
22.
See Bagwell, supra note 18, at 1720-23. Some of the key works in the
complementary theory include Gary S. Becker & Kevin M. Murphy, A Simple Theory of
Advertising as a Good or Bad, 108 Q.J. ECON. 941 (1993) (analyzing the consumer-welfare
effects of complementary advertising and demonstrating that, in some circumstances,
advertising may be undersupplied); Len M. Nichols, Advertising and Economic Welfare, 75
AM. ECON. REV. 213, 213-15 (1985) (analyzing the same); George J. Stigler & Gary S.
Becker, De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 76, 83-87 (1977)
(demonstrating that even in a world of stable consumer preferences and perfect
competition, advertising can provide value that complements the value of the advertised
good, changing equilibrium prices).
23.
John Philip Jones, for instance, identifies seven ways advertising can affect
consumer prices-lowering prices in four cases and raising them in three. See Jones, supra
note 18, at 56-69.
24.
Portions of the other theories also suggest advertising can be a social good. For
instance, all kinds of advertising can promote economies of scale, which can-but need not
necessarily-reduce the cost of products. See Braithwaite, supra note 20, at 17-20; Jones,
supra note 18, at 63-67; see also infra notes 30-31 and accompanying text. Likewise, all
kinds of advertising reduce the cost to consumers of television, newspapers, websites, and
other forms of media. See Jones, supra note 18, at 68-69. The complementary view of
advertising also suggests that even ads with no apparent information content can be
socially valuable. See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
25.
See, e.g., Stigler, supra note 21, at 220-24 (discussing pricing information in
advertising); Telser, supra note 21, at 550-51, 556-57 (assessing information about new
products in advertising); see also Phillip Nelson, Information and Consumer Behavior, 78
J. POL. EcON. 311, 312-18, 323-25 (1970) (introducing the concepts of search goods and
experience goods and demonstrating how advertising can usefully provide information
about each category of goods).
26.
See Bagwell, supra note 18, at 18-19, 19 n.13 (quoting Nelson, supra note 21, at
734 (summarizing three reasons indirect information is provided to consumers)).
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a reliable and efficient supplier. 27 Advertising also helps match
consumers with products that best fit their tastes and remind
consumers of their past positive experiences with a company. 28
Advertising could also be socially harmful. One way this could
work is if advertising shaped consumer demand instead of
informing it; then it could have a distorting effect, shifting demand
away from consumers' "true" or ideal preferences. 29 A consumer
who sees ads for a car might buy that car, then, instead of a
different, cheaper car that she would value more or that would
better serve her needs; a consumer who sees ads for cigarettes
might become addicted to nicotine as a teenager. A second
mechanism would be if advertising promoted industry
concentration; in particular cases this could be good (if economies
of scale led to lower prices) or bad (if firms innovated less or
charged higher prices because of reduced competition). 30
Advertising might promote concentration by building customer
loyalty, erecting new barriers to entry; or it might do so because of
economies of scale in advertising. If incumbents have more money
to spend and more experience crafting ads-think of the in-house
expertise a company like Procter & Gamble has in advertising dish
soap and laundry detergent, and how much ground a new entrant
would have to make up-then the incumbents would get better
results per advertising dollar. This could create a feedback loop
that promotes industry concentration. Alternatively, of course,
advertising could help entrants break into the market by telling
consumers about their products. 3 1
Economic theory, then, can tell optimistic and pessimistic
stories about advertising. Probably both stories contain some
truth; there are many kinds of advertising, for many kinds of
products, directed at many kinds of consumers. The empirical
literature provides support for both stories. 32 Notably, however,
several studies provide support for the information theory of
27.
See id. at 18; Nelson, supra note 21, at 732-34.
28.
See Bagwell, supra note 18, at 19; Nelson, supra note 21, at 733-34.
See GALBRAITH, supra note 20, at 129; PACKARD, supra note 20, at 3-10. Note,
29.
however, the important caveat that if persuasive advertising has value to consumers apart
from its information value-say, from increasing the consumer's level of prestige in others'
eyes-then it can be socially valuable even without appearing to provide information. See
Becker & Murphy, supra note 22, at 942-45; Nichols, supra note 22, at 213-14.
E.g., Braithwaite, supranote 20, at 34-36; Kaldor, supra note 20, at 13-15. For a
30.
review of the empirical literature on advertising scale economies and concentration see
Bagwell, supra note 18, at 30-32.
31.
For a review of the empirical literature on advertising's effect in deterring or
facilitating entry, see Bagwell, supra note 18, at 45-47.
See Jones, supra note 18, at 56-69.
32.
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advertising and its implication that advertising can promote
competition. First, a set of studies finds that advertising has the
greatest effect on consumers who have not made recent purchases
in the advertised category; otherwise, prior experience and loyalty
or inertia plays a much greater role in dictating consumer
behavior. 33 This suggests both that advertising has its greatest
effect on the consumers most in need of information and that it can
do only so much to shape consumer demand. Second, another set
of studies shows that advertising can be especially effective when
it introduces new products or new features of an existing product,
informing consumers about those new products or features. 34
Third, a set of studies shows that consumers respond to specific
information content in advertising. When producers of fibercontaining cereals promoted claims that the cereals helped
prevent cancer, for instance, sales of those cereals spiked out of
proportion to the simple quantity of advertising. 35
The most plausible conclusion, then, is likely that advertising
is, in many cases, socially valuable because it informs consumers
and promotes innovation and competition. At the same time, in
other cases-maybe certain types of advertising like false
advertising 3 6 or advertising to children, 37 or advertising in certain
33.
See, e.g., John Deighton et al., The Effects of Advertising on Brand Switching and
Repeat Purchasing, 31 J. MARKETING RES. 28, 37, 41 (1994); Gerard J. Tellis, Advertising
Exposure, Loyalty, and Brand Purchase:A Two-Stage Model of Choice, 25 J. MARKETING
RES. 134, 139-43 (1988).
34.
See, e.g., Daniel A. Ackerberg, Empirically Distinguishing Informative and
Prestige Effects of Advertising, 32 RAND J. EcoN. 316, 332 (2001); Matthew Shum, Does
Advertising Overcome Brand Loyalty? Evidence from the Breakfast-Cereals Market, 13 J.
EcoN. & MGMT. STRATEGY 241, 245, 261-64 (2004).
35.
See Pauline M. Ippolito & Alan D. Mathios, Information,Advertising and Health
Choices:A Study of the Cereal Market, 21 RAND J. ECON. 459, 461, 479 (1990).
36.
False advertising is prohibited by the Lanham Act and by most states' laws. See
generally 5 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION

§

27 (5th ed. 2018).
No statute comprehensively regulates advertising to children, but two play
37.
prominent regulatory roles. See Children's Television Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-437, 104
Stat. 996 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 303a-303b, 394 (2012)) (empowering the
Federal Communications Commission to regulate children's television programming and
advertising during that programming); 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.670-73.673 (2018) (implementing
the Children's Television Act by requiring broadcast stations to air three hours of
educational programming a week and limiting the number of commercials that can run
during those programs); Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 6501-6506 (limiting the tools available for online advertising to children); 16 C.F.R. pt.
312 (implementing the Act). Moreover, the Federal Trade Commission pays special
attention to advertising that targets children under its general consumer-protection
authority. See, e.g., J. Howard Beales, III, Advertising to Kids and the FTC: A Regulatory
Retrospective That Advises the Present, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 873 (2004); FED. TRADE
COMM'N, A REVIEW OF FOOD MARKETING TO CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS: FoLLOw-UP

REPORT

(2012),

https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/review-food-ma
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product categories like tobacco 38 or prescription drugS 39
advertising might be more problematic. The law has responded
accordingly: false advertising and deceptive and unfair trade
practices are illegal, and advertising in certain industries is highly
regulated, but firms are otherwise largely free to advertise as they
see fit. 4 0

B.

Consumer Datasets,Data Analytics, and TargetingPlatforms

Technology has revolutionized advertising by making it
possible to target individual consumers to an unprecedented
degree, amplifying its effects in ways that heighten this welfare
analysis. When advertising is a social good, this amplification
means that targeted advertising can be an even greater social
good; when advertising is a social ill, targeted advertising is likely
an even greater social ill. The reason is straightforward. Whatever
social role advertising plays, it plays that role only when it works,
rketing-children-and-adolescents-follow-report/121221foodmarketingreportpdf

[https://pe

rma.cclLZ8J-A6ZG]; FED. TRADE COMM'N, MARKETING VIOLENT ENTERTAINMENT TO
CHILDREN: A SIXTH FOLLOW-UP REVIEW OF INDUSTRY PRACTICES IN THE MOTION PICTURE,

Music RECORDING & ELECTRONIC GAME INDUSTRIES (2009), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/defau
It/files/documents/reports/marketing-violent-entertainment-children-sixth-follow-review-i
ndustry-practices-motion-picture-music/p994511violententertainment.pdf [https://perma.c
c/JYM8-WNW7]; DEBRA J. HOLT ET AL., FED. TRADE COMM'N, CHILDREN'S EXPOSURE TO TV
ADVERTISING IN 1977 AND 2004: INFORMATION FOR THE OBESITY DEBATE (2007), https://ww

w.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/childrens-exposure-television-advertising1977-and-2004-information-obesity-debate-bureau-economics/cabecolor.pdf [https://perma.
cc/JNF6-SYJR].
The Food & Drug Administration regulates tobacco products, including their
38.
advertising. See Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31,
123 Stat. 1776 (2009) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.); see also 21
C.F.R. pt. 1140 (restricting the distribution of free samples for tobacco products).
Most countries prohibit direct-to-consumer advertising of prescription drugs. The
39.
United States is (along with New Zealand) an outlier; prescription-drug advertising is
permitted but is regulated by the Food & Drug Administration. See 21 U.S.C. § 352(n);
21 C.F.R. § 202.1; see also Medicines Act 1981, ss 56-62 (N.Z.) (regulating medical
advertisements). Advertisements that discuss the benefits of a drug must also disclose
major side effects and contraindications. 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(1). The effects of direct-toconsumer prescription-drug advertising have been extensively studied. See, e.g., Abby
Alpert et al., PrescriptionDrugAdvertisingand Drug Utilization:The Role ofMedicare Part
D (Nat' Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21714, 2015) (finding that increased
drug advertising after the launch of Medicare Part D led to increased drug utilization
among younger patients not eligible for Medicare Part D); Dhaval M. Dave, Effects of
PharmaceuticalPromotion: A Review and Assessment (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 18830, 2013) (literature review concluding that advertising
significantly increases drug sales, principally by expanding the market for that drug rather
than by taking business from a competitor).
The right balance between the optimistic and pessimistic stories may also change
40.
over time. See, e.g., Ramsi A. Woodcock, The Obsolescence ofAdvertising in the Information
Age, 127 YALE L.J. 2270, 2299-2307 (2018) (arguing that the ready availability of product
information on the internet renders the information content of advertising superfluous).
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and the better targeted it is, the better it works (with some caveats
to be explored shortly). When a car company advertises a new
luxury model, it might aim to persuade consumers to buy the new
car or to inform them about its benefits or to create a perception
that the car is luxurious and driven by successful consumers, but
regardless, its goal is to sell more cars. Advertising that reaches
groups of consumers who are likely to buy the car can do a better
job of persuading or informing or creating a perception in likely
buyers' peer groups; advertising that reaches other, lessinterested consumers is a waste of money.
There are two basic ways advertisers can target customers.
One is indirect, using the advertising venue-the specific
television show or network, magazine or newspaper, website,
billboard location, and so forth-as a proxy for the kinds of people
the advertiser wants to target. 4 1 This is sometimes called
contextual advertising. Rolex and BMW sponsor tennis and golf
tournaments and advertise on their broadcasts because wealthy
people tend to watch and play those sports; 42 defense contractors
advertise in the Washington subway stops near the Pentagon and
Capitol so they'll be seen by staffers making procurement
decisions; 43 the consulting firm Accenture advertises in airports in
part to boost the morale of its frequent-flyer employees. 44
Sometimes the targeted group is the type of consumer who would
be interested in the product, as when diapers are advertised to new
parents or Medicare prescription-drug plans to the elderly. Other
times the purpose is subtler. For instance, some sellers will
advertise the same product to different audiences in different
ways, trying to tailor the message to the audience. Or, some sellers
See, e.g., Ambarish Chandra, Targeted Advertising. The Role of Subscriber
41.
Characteristicsin Media Markets, 57 J. INDUS. EcON. 58, 76, 82-83 (2009) (finding that
newspapers in competitive markets have higher advertising prices than similar
newspapers in noncompetitive markets, because they can segment the market and better
target specific groups of readers).
E.g., Malcolm Moore, Sponsorship on the Rise as Golf ParticipationRates Fall,
42.
FIN. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/b75928cO-410b-11e5-b98b-87c7270
955cf (quoting the head of a sports agency: "[E]ven when there are ups and downs in the
economy, golf is still the sport of business and that makes it alluring to sponsors").
E.g., Gary Leff, Boeing Pitches a Fit After Losing Out on $80 Billion Defense
43.
Contract, VIEW FROM WING (Nov. 7, 2015), https://viewfromthewing.boardingarea.com/2015
[https://perma.cc
/1 1/07/boeing-pitches-a-fit-after-losing-out-on-80-billion-defense-contract/
/7QNZ-KTN5]; Anne Riley, Defense Lobbying Goes Underground, OPENSECRETS (June 27,
2007), https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2007/06/defense-lobbying-goes-undergro/ [https://
perma.cc/X6P6-EP4F]; Stephanie Westbrook, Occupied, D.C., THESE TIMES (May 28, 2010),
http://inthesetimes.com/article/6009/occupiedd.c [https://perma.cc/PV6J-TEJK].
Mark Suster, The Silent Benefits of PR, BOTH SIDES TABLE (Oct. 25, 2014), https://
44.
bothsidesofthetable.com/the-silent-benefits-of-pr-29ae38417eO3 [https://perma.ccdMG6C-Z
Czw].
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will target audiences for strategic reasons, as when Subaru
targeted rural audiences in the 1970s because they were less likely
to have seen ConsumerReports'scathing review of the first car the
company sold in the United States. 45 Whatever the purpose,
indirect targeting is as old as advertising itself. It is necessarily
wasteful, though, since every time a potential buyer of high-end
watches sees a Rolex ad, so do many others who have no interest. 46
The other form of targeting is direct and individualized. When
a company can tell which specific consumers are most likely to be
receptive to the message and has a way to advertise only to those
consumers, it can avoid the waste inherent in less-targeted forms
of advertising. Many types of advertising can't be customized on
this sort of individual basis-a magazine can't realistically print
different ads in each subscriber's copy, for instance.4 7 Historically
these factors have made individualized targeting rare, mostly
limited to direct mail.4 8 Direct mail is less engaging than other
forms of advertising like television, though, so individualized
targeting has historically had limited use. 4 9
Even when individual targeting is possible, the techniques
used to identify individual consumers are not free. Some of them
are straightforward, like when a company keeps a mailing list of
customers who have purchased its products in the past; those
people are good targets because they have already demonstrated a
need and affinity for the firm's products. Or a list broker might

&

45.
See Bob Sorokanich, How Subaru Became the Unofficial Car of Vermont, ROAD
TRACK (Mar.
23,
2018),
https://www.roadandtrack.com/car-culture/classic-cars/al
9563992/how-subaru-became-the-unofEicial-car-of-vermont/ [https://perma.cclL49N-5GEL]
(explaining how Subaru targeted rural areas in Vermont, Minnesota, Washington, New
Hampshire, and western Pennsylvania because consumers there were less likely to have
seen Consumer Reports' conclusion that the Subaru 360 was "unacceptably hazardous').
46.
See Randal C. Picker, The Digital Video Recorder: Unbundling Advertising and
Content, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 205, 207 (2004).
47.
Or at least, magazines haven't historically been able to do so, since offset printing
has substantial fixed costs for each print run. But technology is making it possible. See, e.g.,
D. Eadward Tree, 6 Ways to Grow Revenue with Digitally-Printed Magazines, PUB.
EXECUTIVE (Nov. 14, 2017), http://www.pubexec.com/post/6-ways-magazine-publishers-can
-increase-revenue-digital-printing/ [https://perma.cc/4AS6-VA5P] (noting that when the
magazine Farm Journal included a targeted 8-page advertising insert for just 450
subscribers, selected based on their purchasing history, it generated $50,000 in incremental
revenue).
&

48.
See, e.g., DAVID OGILVY, OGILVY ON ADVERTISING 143-49 (1983); BOB STONE
RON JACOBS, SUCCESSFUL DIRECT MARKETING METHODS 287-88 (7th ed. 2001). Modern

data brokers have gotten into the business as well. See, e.g., Direct Mail Marketing,
EXPERIAN, https://www.experian.com/small-business/direct-mail-marketing.jsp [https://per
ma.cc/8VJK-YGV8] (last visited Sept. 12, 2019).
49.
See generally OGILVY, supra note 48, at 143; STONE & JACOBS, supra note 48, at
195, 287.
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assemble a list of people who have purchased a certain kind of
product in the past, or expressed an interest in a certain category
of goods.5 0 Or a political candidate might purchase a mailing list
of voters who are registered to vote in that candidate's primary, or
who have contributed to similar campaigns; those voters are good
targets because they are likely to share the candidate's positions
and have demonstrated a willingness to fund similar campaigns.
Even people who have fallen for a scam once can be a promising
target for further scams of the same kind. 51 Other targeting
methods are subtler, as when a marketer targets people whose
psychological profiles might make them susceptible to a pitch. For
decades, magazines contained ads for nose-hair trimmers and
other embarrassing products not because the sellers made money
selling them but because someone with enough self-regard to want
a nose-hair trimmer, but embarrassed enough not to buy it in a
store, turns out to be a great target for other products. 52 Modern
direct-mail targeting can be incredibly sophisticated (and
correspondingly expensive). Target, for instance, got a lot of
attention when it used its extensive information on individual
shoppers' purchases to infer which customers had recently become
pregnant, so it could mail them coupons for baby stuff.5 3
Three pieces of modern technology have transformed targeted
advertising, making it easier and cheaper to target individual
consumers without going to the trouble of building a list or using
the mail. 5 4 First, much more information is available about
50.
See, e.g., Miller Asks Court to Order List Broker to Respond to Telemarketing
FraudProbe, IOWA DEP'T JUST. (Mar. 3, 2005), https://www.iowaattorneygeneral.gov/newsr
oom/miller-asks-court-to-order-list-broker-to-respond-to-telemarketing-fraud-probe
[https
://perma.cc/9C6L-6YT6] (claiming that list broker Walter Karl, Inc. sold lists described as
containing "avid sweepstakes players, ... sweepstakes enthusiasts[,] ... cash-hungry
individuals, impulsive buyers ... primarily mature, hard core sweeps fanatics, creditseeking individuals ... looking ... for ways to regain a good credit standing, and
sweepstakes contestants over the age of 40, with household income of approximately
$25,000," which were allegedly used for illegal telemarketing scams).
51.
E.g., Jason Cossman, The Stoned Leading the Blind, HARPER'S MAG., June 2008,
at 1, 20 (describing a scam by which essentially identical products are sold under two
different brand names, the first for an auto-renewing $84.50 a month, and the second to
people who call to cancel the first).
52.
See, e.g., Frances Cole Jones, A Perfect Business Model: Nose Hair Trimmers,
FORBES (Feb. 16, 2011, 2:17 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/work-in-progress/2011/02/1
6/a-perfect-business-model-nose-hair-trimmers/ [https://perma.cclLPH5-GSQX].
53.
Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Feb. 16,
2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html
[https://perm
a.cclTL6A-NWFJ]; Kashmir Hill, How Target FiguredOut a Teen Girl Was PregnantBefore
Her FatherDid, FORBES (Feb. 16, 2012, 11:02 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhi
11/2012/02/16/how-target-figured-out-a-teen-girl-was-pregnant-before-her-father-did/
[htt
ps://perma.cclHKZ8-75DB].
54.
For a useful overview of this transformation, see MIKE SMITH, TARGETED (2014).
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individual consumers in the form of commercial datasets.5 5 Most
consumers are familiar with data collected for specific purposes
like assessing creditworthiness, but the sheer number of
companies goes far beyond the three major credit bureaus, with
thousands of largely unregulated data brokers maintaining-and
selling access to-files on individual consumers.5 6 Second,
increases in computer processing and storage capabilities have
made it easier and cheaper to process this information to draw
inferences. With a sufficiently comprehensive dataset, then, a
company can determine which consumers are most likely to be
receptive to a specific piece of advertising.5 7 Third, online targeting
platforms have productized and commoditized targeting-turned
what was an expensive service or task requiring custom internal
work into one sold as a standard product 5 8 -so

that advertisers

can use individualized targeting without substantial investments
of time, money, or expertise. 59 Some of these platforms, like Google
For a representative how-to guide on ways to take advantage of the transformation, see, for
example, IAN DODSON, THE ART OF DIGITAL MARKETING (2016). For discussions of how
these targeting techniques have been used in election campaigning-including before the
Russian government used Twitter and Facebook targeting to troll the 2016 presidential
election-see EITAN D. HERSH, HACKING THE ELECTORATE 66-87 (2015); SASHA ISSENBERG,
THE VICTORY LAB 272-75 (2012); DANIEL KREISS, PROTOTYPE POLITICS 204-20 (2016), and

also Sheera Frenkel & Katie Benner, To Stir Discord in 2016, Russians Turned Most Often
to Facebook, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/17/technology/
[https://perma.cc/XKZ4-J9RW] ("Facebook built
indictment-russian-tech-facebook.html
incredibly effective tools which let Russia profile citizens here in the U.S. and figure out
how to manipulate us.").
55.
See, e.g., STAFF OF S. COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCI., & TRANSP., 113TH CONG., A
REVIEW OF THE DATA BROKER INDUSTRY: COLLECTION, USE, AND SALE OF CONSUMER DATA
FOR MARKETING PURPOSES 13-21 (2013); FED. TRADE COMM'N, DATA BROKERS: A CALL FOR
TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 13-15 (2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/docum

ents/reports/data-brokers-call-transparency-accountability-report-federal-trade-commissio
n-may-2014/140527databrokerreport.pdf [https://perma.cclJ9D4-PZWH].
56.
On the estimate that there are thousands of data brokers, see Susan Moore, How
to Choose a Data Broker, GARTNER (June 8, 2016), https://www.gartner.com/smarterwithg
artner/how-to-choose-a-data-broker/ [https://perma.cc/8UYC-C3Q5] ("Gartner estimates
there may be up to 5,000 data brokers ... worldwide, plus nearly 10 million open datasets
published by government agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).").
Cambridge Analytica, the analytics firm that worked with the Trump campaign
57.
in 2016, for instance, claimed that it developed psychological profiles of 230 million
Americans from data taken from Facebook profiles. Carole Cadwalladr, 'I Made Steve
Bannon's Psychological Warfare Tool': Meet the Data War Whistleblower, GUARDIAN (Mar.
18, 2018, 9:44 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/mar/17/data-war-whistleblo
wer-christopher-wylie-faceook-nix-bannon-trump [https://perma.cc/CA5Z-SN8U].
See Dennis Kennedy, Subscription Offer, A.B.A. J., Apr. 2015, at 1, 33; Mohanbir
58.
Sawhney, PuttingProducts into Services, HARV. Bus. REV. (Sept. 2016), https://hbr.org/2016
/09/putting-products-into-services [https://perma.cc/28P5-MG7N].
59.
Facebook advertising, for instance, requires a minimum budget of just 500 or $1
a day, depending on the currency used. See Ads Help Center: About Minimum Budgets,
FACEBOOK BUS., https://www.facebook.com/business/help/203183363050448 [https://perm
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and Facebook, are familiar to users, while others, like the ad
networks deploying the thousands of tracking tools blocked by
various browser extensions, are less well known.6 0 All of them
have helped transform targeted advertising from a sophisticated
and expensive endeavor requiring substantial effort to one that is
available to advertisers of all sizes and levels of sophistication.
Modern individualized targeting may or may not require
connecting a profile to a real-world identity, which means the
implications for consumers are not uniform. Some forms of
targeting use profiles of individual, identifiable users and cannot
work without those profiles. Most targeted direct mail works this
way; credit-card companies, for instance, solicit individuals with
specific credit profiles, which requires linking information about
creditworthiness to names and addresses.6 1 Likewise, political
campaigns build detailed profiles of individual voters, which they
a.cc/NK6W-W7MF] (last visited Sept. 12, 2019).
60.
These trackers work by referencing third-party resources in a webpage's code; the
New York Times website, for instance, might load an ad from servers run by DoubleClick,
a Google subsidiary that places online ads. The user's browser, when it reads and executes
that code, will reach out to the DoubleClick server asking for an ad. If DoubleClick has
previously placed a cookie on the computer with a unique ID number, the browser will also
generally provide that ID number. Because more than one website uses DoubleClick to
serve ads, DoubleClick can develop a profile of that user across multiple websites. These
third-party resources can have many different uses; some, like font or commenting services,
provide important functionality for users, while others, like trackers and ad servers, are
things a user might want to block. Dozens of such plugins have popped up, typically using
databases of known trackers to decide which third-party resources should be blocked. For
instance, as of August 30, 2019, the database used by the Ghostery plugin contains over
4,500 trackers, broken up into categories like "advertising," "site analytics," "audio/video
player," and "adult content and comments." See Brian Barrett, Ghostery Deploys AI in the
Fight Against Ad Trackers, WIRED (Dec. 5, 2017, 9:55 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/
ghostery-deploys-ai-in-fight-against-ad-trackers/ [https://perma.cc/9TE6-868T]; How Are
Ghostery Lite Tracker CategoriesDefined and Maintained?, GHOSTERY, https://www.ghoste
ry.com/faqs/how-are-ghostery-lite-tracker-categories-defined-and-maintained/
[https://per
ma.cc/BB9V-NQCU] (last visited Sept. 12, 2019); How Many Trackers Does Ghostery Have
in Our Library?, GHOSTERY, https://www.ghostery.com/faqs/many-trackers-ghostery/ [htt
ps://perma.cc/94DU-U5NW] (last visited Sept. 12, 2019). A competitive market for blocking
plugins has emerged on several platforms; for others, see, for example, ADBLOCK PLUS,
https://adblockplus.org/ [https://perma.cclFD9F-FBU5] (last visited Sept. 12, 2019); John
Corpuz, Best Ad Blockers and Privacy Extensions, TOM's GUIDE, https://www.tomsgui
de.com/us/pictures-story/565-best-adblockers-privacy-extensions.html
[https://perma.ce/Y
AR6-PA8Y] (last visited Sept. 12, 2019); Privacy Badger, EFF, https://www.eff.org/priv
acybadger/ [https://perma.cclV56T-PKUK] (last visited Sept. 12, 2019). Tracker-blocking
plugins have also made the leap from desktop web browsers to phones and tablets. See, e.g.,
Mike Shields, Apple Software Update BringsAd Blockers Along with Apple News Sponsors,
WALL ST. J.: CMO TODAY (Sept. 16, 2015, 3:50 PM), https://blogs.wsj.com/cmo/2015/09/16/
apple-software-update-brings-ad-blockers-along-with-apple-news-sponsors/
[https://perma.cc/L6E6-VFD5].
61.
See Prescreened Credit and Insurance Offers, FED. TRADE COMM'N (Mar. 2011),
https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/pdf-0035-prescreened-credit-and-insurance-offers.p
df [https://perma.cc/583F-QJGX].
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can use to ask those voters for donations, choose the campaign
literature most likely to persuade them, and help know who to
focus on getting out to the polls. 6 2 Other forms of targeting, though,
work even if no individual identity is ever tied to the profile. This
is behavioral advertising, and most online targeting works this
way, with ad networks using random ID numbers to build
demographic profiles that need not be connected to any real-world
identity. An ad network might infer, for instance, based on
browsing history that user number 82332943 spends time on sites
about video games, action movies, and car racing, while user
82332944 is more interested in luxury travel, fashion, and
financial services. The ad network can use that info to show
relevant ads without ever linking those profiles to specific people.
The shift from indirectly to directly targeted advertising has
two major effects. The first is the efficiency gain discussed above;
to the extent targeting lets advertisers avoid showing their ads to
people not in the right groups, it can save money. The second effect
is that direct targeting requires collecting and using a lot of
information about individual users, which necessarily leads to
privacy losses. This is a substantial effect, but one I will largely
set to the side in this Article. 63
Notably, though, the efficiency gains from targeted
advertising can be more complicated than the simple story would
indicate, for several reasons. For one, only some kinds of
See ISSENBERG, supranote 54, at 56-63; Bill Lambrecht, Thump's DigitalAd Exec
62.
Based in San Antonio, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS (Nov. 15, 2016), https://www.expressne
ws.com/news/1ocal/article/Trump-s-digital-ad-exec-based-in-San-Antonio-10616777.php [ht
tps://perma.cc/2YAJ-UX8M] (quoting Brad Parscale, who ran digital operations for the 2016
Trump campaign and has been named as campaign manager for the 2020 reelection bid:
"Maybe you see an ad on Facebook and donate $5. Now you're in my system. So now it
doesn't become efficient for me to get money from you on Facebook because they charge me.
So I start using other means; cellphone, email and other operations to get to you to make
further donations."); Issie Lapowsky, Here's How Facebook Actually Won Trump the
Presidency, WIRED (Nov. 15, 2016, 1:12 PM), https://www.wired.com/2016/11/facebook-wonNames
trump-election-not-just-fake-news/ [https://perma.ccl72YE-4FX5]; Tim Mak, Trump
2 27
8
2020 CampaignManager, NPR (Feb. 27, 2018, 2:08 PM), https://www.npr.org/201 /0 / /5
[https://perma.cc/Q5N7-XLNB].
89210484/trump-names-2020-campaign-manager
For just a bit of the voluminous work on the privacy issues presented by targeted
63.
advertising and individualized targeting, see, for example, DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL
PERSON (Jack M. Balkin & Beth Simone Noveck eds., 2004); Danielle Keats Citron,
Reservoirs of Danger: The Evolution of Public and Private Law at the Dawn of the
Information Age, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 241 (2007); David S. Evans, The Online Advertising
Industry: Economics, Evolution, and Privacy, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 2009, at 37; Chris
Jay Hoofnagle & Jan Whittington, Free: Accounting for the Costs of the Internet's Most
PopularPrice, 61 UCLA L. REV. 606 (2014); Jerry Kang, InformationPrivacy in Cyberspace
Transactions,50 STAN. L. REV. 1193 (1998); Paul Ohm, BrandingPrivacy, 97 MINN. L. REV.
907 (2013); Katherine J. Strandburg, Free Fall: The Online Market's Consumer Preference
Disconnect, 2013 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 95.
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advertising benefit from targeting. Advertising to niche
communities, for instance, may be impossible without targeting.
But in other cases, advertising requires wide distribution to work
in the first place. Ads for major consumer brands like Coca-Cola
and Apple aim for scale and widespread distribution since those
firms try to sell their products to as many people as possible, so
there's little benefit to targeting. Likewise, even companies trying
to sell their products to limited audiences, like makers of luxury
goods, may depend on brand cachet and awareness to generate a
sense of exclusivity. 64
When a narrow audience is desired, the gains from targeting
can be muted for other reasons. For one, the fact that targeting
can make advertising more efficient doesn't tell us how much more
efficient that is; if targeting produces a 20% gain in advertising
efficiency, that's a different story than if it produces a 2% gain or
a 0.2% gain. There's surprisingly little research on the question,
likely because the parties in the best position to know-the
targeting platforms themselves-have good reason to protect those
numbers as trade secrets. 65
Targeting can also be counterproductive for advertisers,
offsetting the efficiency gains. This is so because some consumers
don't like it when advertising appears to be targeted, which can
appear creepy and highlight the amount of information

64.

See, e.g., JEAN-NOEL KAPFERER & VINCENT BASTIEN, THE LuxuRY STRATEGY 69-

70 (2009). Indeed, one of Kapferer and Bastien's "anti-laws" of luxury marketing is
"[c]ommunicate to those whom you are not targeting," because "[i]n luxury, if somebody is
looking at somebody else and fails to recognize the brand, part of its value is lost." Id.
65.
Part of the trouble is that the right metric would compare targeted advertising
not to purely untargeted advertising, but to indirect forms of targeting like contextual
advertising. When an ad matches the context in which it appears-when car ads appear on
car websites or search-engine ads are based on the keywords searched, for instance-it
should provide many of the benefits of targeting without the need to build user profiles or
the attendant privacy risks. Many of the studies evaluating targeted advertising compare
it instead to untargeted advertising like run-of-network advertising, in which an ad appears
randomly across an ad network's inventory. E.g., J. HOWARD BEALES & JEFFREY A.
EISENACH, AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE VALUE OF INFORMATION SHARING IN THE

&

MARKET FOR ONLINE CONTENT 8-15 (2014), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2421405 [https://per
ma.c/WE27-GFPP]; HOWARD BEALES, THE VALUE OF BEHAVIORAL TARGETING 6-17 (2010),
https://www.networkadvertising.org/pdfs/BealesNAIStudy.pdf. [https://perma.cc/54M4-3
KLR] The most prominent study found that advertising effectiveness fell sharply in Europe
after the E.U. Privacy Directive limited the ability of companies to build user profiles,
suggesting that targeting was responsible for much of the value of web ads. Avi Goldfarb
Catherine E. Tucker, PrivacyRegulation and Online Advertising, 57 MGMT. SCI. 57, 58, 6970 (2011). That result, though, is hard to evaluate given the small effect size of ads both
before and after the Privacy Directive; the authors also found that the effect is mitigated
by using contextual advertising instead of run-of-network advertising. See Strandburg,
supra note 63, at 102-05.
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advertisers have about people. 6 6 So when companies use targeting
in ways that consumers can perceive, the privacy losses can undo
the efficiency gains from targeting. Target, for instance, saw this
when it figured out how to tell if a customer was pregnant. The
company used that information to send coupons for baby stuff,
backfiring spectacularly when customers found it incredibly
creepy to get a "congratulations on your upcoming baby!" mailing
from a giant faceless corporation. Sometimes a customer had lost
the pregnancy; sometimes a customer was a teenager whose
parents found out about the pregnancy from Target; sometimes
they just found it creepy. Whatever the reason, customers didn't
respond by buying baby stuff from Target-until the company
found an ingenious loophole. Instead of sending pregnant
customers baby-themed mailings, they would just send a packet of
seemingly unrelated coupons, with some baby-themed ones
67
sprinkled in among decoy coupons. That worked. The effect is not
unique to Target and mail-order coupons; the same can be true
online, as when a user shops for a specific product and then sees
ads for that product on other websites. 68 Marketers must be
careful, then, not to go too far in using consumer data to target
their ads.
Even when targeting works for an advertiser, the same
interdependence between privacy and efficiency holds for society
as a whole. Targeting might make advertising work better,
allowing platforms and advertisers to make more money. It might
also provide benefits for consumers, who get free content and learn
about goods and services that are relevant to their interests. But
See Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, A Theory of Creepy: Technology, Privacy and
66.
Shifting Social Norms, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 59, 66-69 (2013).
See Duhigg, supra note 53; Hill, supra note 53.
67.
For instance, Avi Goldfarb and Catherine Tucker found that two distinct
68.
interventions-making the ad more targeted and more obtrusive-each individually
increased the effectiveness of online advertising, but when combined, they decreased the
ads' effectiveness. They attributed this difference to privacy concerns: obtrusive ads that
appeared targeted were counterproductive, with the biggest drops in effectiveness coming
from users who refused to give their income and for categories where privacy concerns were
especially salient. They concluded that their results could explain why the market for online
advertising is increasingly bifurcated into highly targeted text ads and "more visually
striking but less targeted ads." Avi Goldfarb & Catherine Tucker, Online Display
Advertising: Targeting and Obtrusiveness, 30 MARKETING SCI. 389, 400 (2011). In another
experiment, Anja Lambrecht and Catherine Tucker found that targeted travel ads-ads
showing specific hotels that the targeted users had previously looked at-were less effective
than generic hotel ads. This effect, though, didn't seem to be driven by privacy, but instead
by consumers going through multiple stages of shopping, since targeted ads became more
effective after users had visited a review site, indicating that they were specifically
interested in those hotels. Anja Lambrecht & Catherine Tucker, When Does Retargeting
Work? Information Specificity in Online Advertising, 50 J. MARKETING RES. 561, 573-575
(2013).
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it also creates privacy costs-costs that are largely borne by
consumers and the rest of society, not by platforms and
advertisers. Just as privacy concerns might blunt the effectiveness
of targeting in the individual case, privacy harms might offset the
social benefits of targeting.
A realistic account of online targeting and online advertising,
then, is more nuanced than the simple efficiency-versus-privacy
story might indicate. Targeting can make advertising more
efficient, which can be a good thing when advertising is a good
thing. These gains are offset, however, both by the costs of privacy
losses for consumers and for society and by the ways that targeting
can reduce the effectiveness of advertising in the first place.
Moreover, this conventional view doesn't account for other effects
of online targeting, like making it easier to perpetuate scams, as I
discuss in the next Part.
III. DATA SCAMS

For as long as there has been human civilization, there have
been people who try to take unfair advantage of others. These
scams take countless forms, from outright frauds to subtler
schemes that may or may not violate the law. Though they are
nothing new, many of these scams become easier to perpetuate,
and harder to detect and prevent, due to the targeting tools
discussed above. This Part discusses how data affects scams, first
reviewing different kinds of scams and then discussing how
modern targeting changes things for scammers and those trying
to detect and prevent scams.
A.

Scams

"Scam"-like "privacy," "design," and a lot of other terms that
play important roles in modern technology law-is a broad and
imprecise word that can encompass many kinds of behavior. I use
the word instead of one with a more-specific meaning, like fraud,
because there are many kinds of scams, with many different
elements, that can be perpetuated online. Some involve lying to
their victims, for instance, but others might tell the truth but prey
on other vulnerabilities to take advantage.
In this Article, I use the term to describe a wide variety of
frauds, schemes, rip-offs, flimflams, tricks, and other dirty
businesses or transactions. There are two critical elements and
one nonelement, each discussed below. First, a scam is an effort to
take advantage of a victim. This can be characterized in several
ways: maybe a scammer manipulates or deceives a victim or
presents her with unfair choices. In general, though, a victim of a
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scam makes a seemingly voluntary choice to act in a way that
69
benefits the scammer and harms her own interests. Second, this
means that a scam involves two participants: a scammer who
perpetuates the scam and benefits from it, and a victim who is
harmed (or intended to be harmed) by it. This separates scams
from ordinary market transactions in which both participants
benefit, even though some such transactions will involve deception
70
or some other scam-like behavior along the way. Third, neither
of these elements requires the scam to be illegal. While some
scams clearly violate criminal law or constitute civil wrongs,
others might be legal or might not have been addressed
definitively by courts and policy makers.
1. Taking Advantage. The fundamental nature of a scam is
that it takes advantage of someone. Scammers seek to do this by
71
causing the victim to act contrary to her own interests. There are
lots of ways to do this-lying to, or deceiving, a victim; appealing
to her emotions; exploiting various cognitive biases; maybe
making it easier to make a dumb choice than a smart one-but for
all of them, the goal is to get the victim to do something or give up
something that benefits the scammer. A scam, then, would not
work if the victim had full information and acted rationally.
There are different ways to characterize a scammer's actions,
and no single vocabulary has yet developed to describe a
phenomenon that turns out to be fairly widespread. The law has
its own language: criminal law bans frauds and schemes or
72
artifices to defraud in a variety of contexts, while the Federal
Trade Commission is charged with going after deceptive and unfair
Scams, then, are a subset of what economists call "demerit goods," like cigarettes
69.
or liquor, which are overconsumed due to imperfect knowledge or other market failures.
See, e.g., RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND

PRACTICE 328-29 (2d ed. 1976); John G. Head, On Merit Goods, 25 FINANZARCHIV 1, 3
(1966) (Ger.).
Consider a buyer negotiating a purchase who says that an offer is as low as they
70.
can go, or a seller who says another buyer is interested in the item, when those things are
not in fact true.
In one sense, a victim of a scam acts voluntarily; this separates scams from simple
71.
crimes or torts like theft or assault. Though this view raises critical questions about what
it means to act voluntarily when cognitive biases and failures cause people to act in
predictably irrational ways.
In the federal system, see, for example, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012) (mail fraud); id.
72.
fraud); id. § 1344 (bank fraud); id. § 1347 (health-care fraud); id. § 1348
(wire
§ 1343
(securities and commodities fraud). In the states, see, for example, N.Y. PENAL LAW
§§ 170.00-190.89 (McKinney 2019) (Title K, "offenses involving fraud"). Fraud is itself a
term with a lot of meanings, but the essence focuses on dishonesty, requiring an intentional
or reckless misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact to induce another to act to
her detriment. See Fraud, BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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trade practices. 73 Other fields have weighed in too. The
philosophers Daniel Susser, Beate Roessler, and Helen
Nissenbaum identify and describe manipulation as "imposing a
hidden or covert influence on another person's decision-making,"
which they contrast with other forms of influence like persuasion
and coercion. 74 The economists George Akerlof and Robert Shiller
use phishingas a term for ways of "getting people to do things that
are in the interest of the phisherman, but not in the interest of the
target."7 5 They borrow the term from internet scams designed to
obtain personal information but argue by analogy that it can apply
to a broad array of scams in a variety of contexts. And the legal
scholar Brett Frischmann and philosopher Evan Selinger talk
about tools and technology being used to "re-engineer" humans,
like when companies manipulate their workplaces to encourage
productivity or schools distribute fitness trackers to encourage
exercise (normalizing surveillance in the process). 7 6
These are all variations on a theme. In each of these
conceptions, a scammer uses any of a variety of tools to take
advantage of a victim to act in a way that benefits the scammer.
And in all of them, courts and scholars have cautioned against
narrowly drawn definitions, instead interpreting terms flexibly to
cover a variety of scams.
The federal mail- and wire-fraud statutes, for instance, leave
"scheme or artifice to defraud" undefined, and courts have
consistently declined to provide a more-precise definition.7 7 Courts
73.
See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2).
74.
Susser et al., supra note 6, at 22; see also Daniel Susser et al., Technology,
Autonomy, and Manipulation, INTERNET POL'Y REv., June 30, 2019, at 1, 3-4. For related
discussions of manipulation, see, for example, Cass R. Sunstein, Fifty Shades of
Manipulation, 1 J. MARKETING BEHAV. 213, 218 (2015); Tal Z. Zarsky, The Problem of
Theorizing Privacy: Privacy and Manipulation in the Digital Age, 20 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 157, 169-74 (2019).
75.

GEORGE A. AKERLOF & ROBERT J. SHILLER, PHISHING FOR PHOOLS xi (2015)

(describing the origins of, and drawing an analogy to, the term phishing in the Internet
context).
76.

BRETT FRIsCHMANN & EvAN SELINGER, RE-ENGINEERING HUMANITY 17-28, 53-

59 (2018).
77.
Courts have been far more willing to define and limit the kinds of benefits that
can give rise to fraud liability. In McNally v. United States, for instance, the Supreme Court

limited the mail- and wire-fraud statutes to efforts to obtain money or other forms of
property. McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 358-60 (1987). Congress responded by
expanding those crimes to cover a "scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible
right of honest services." 18 U.S.C. § 1346. The Supreme Court has interpreted that
provision narrowly, though, holding that it applies only when a defendant receives bribes
or kickbacks, thereby defrauding the defendant's employer or (in the case of an elected
official) voters. Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 404-13 (2010). The fact that the
money or property in such a scheme came from a third party rather than from the defrauded
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generally expect some element of deception or dishonesty, but that
is not especially limiting, as the Fifth Circuit explained in Gregory
v. United States: "The aspect of the scheme to 'defraud' is
measured by nontechnical standard. It is a reflection of moral
uprightness, of fundamental honesty, fair play and right dealing
78
in the general and business life of members of society." A wide
variety of scams, then, have been found to fall within the statutes.
In Gregory, for instance, the defendant used backdated postmarks
to mail entries in a contest to predict college-football scores and
win a Cadillac. 79 The postmarks suggested that the picks had been
mailed by the midweek deadline before the weekend's games,
when instead they had been filled out after the games had been
played.8 0 The Court had no trouble finding mail fraud because the
defendant "found a way to gain an advantage" by "pretend[ing]
8
that his prediction was . .. made and mailed by" the deadline.
82
The lack of a single affirmative false statement did not matter.
At the same time, other cases find that even concededly false
statements or concededly material omissions do not amount to
fraud when a reasonable counterparty would not rely on the
statement or omission. 83
The Federal Trade Commission Act's prohibition on deceptive
and unfair trade practices is even more expansive in the sheer
scope of prohibited activities, though it's limited to commercial
practices. Under section 5 of the Act, "unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in or affecting commerce" are unlawful and subject to the
FTC's enforcement authority. 84 The terms are intentionally broad
85
and vague, giving the FTC substantial enforcement discretion.
party-that the transaction had three parties instead of two--didn't matter, the Court
explained. Id. at 410. It was still a scheme to obtain money or property and so covered by
the statutes. Id.
Gregory v. United States, 253 F.2d 104, 109 (5th Cir. 1958). But see In re EDC,
78.
Inc., 930 F.2d 1275, 1281 (7th Cir. 1991) (rejecting the "hyperbole" of Gregory and asserting
that "[r]ead literally it would put federal judges in the business of creating new crimes;
federal criminal law would be the nation's moral vanguard").
Gregory, 253 F.2d at 106-07.
79.
Id. at 106.
80.
Id. at 109.
81.
Id.
82.
E.g., United States v. Weimert, 819 F.3d 351, 357-58 (7th Cir. 2016); Reynolds v.
83.
E. Dyer Dev. Co., 882 F.2d 1249, 1252-53 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Kwiat, 817 F.2d
440, 445-46 (7th Cir. 1987).
Federal Trade Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 63-203, ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 717, 719
84.
(1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1)-(2) (2012)).
FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 239-40 (1972); Atl. Ref. Co. v.
85.
FTC, 381 U.S. 357, 367 (1965); FTC v. Bunte Bros., 312 U.S. 349, 353 (1941); FTC v.
Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 243 (3d Cir. 2015); see also CHRIS JAY
HOOFNAGLE,

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION: PRIVACY LAW AND POLICY 119-20 (2016)
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Though the Act does not define "deceptive," the FTC explained in
a policy statement that it requires a "representation, omission or
practice that is likely to mislead the consumer." 86 The Act also
specifies that a practice can only be unlawful as "unfair" if it
"causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which
is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not
outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to
competition."8 7 Beyond those constraints, Congress has allowed
the FTC to develop a body of law interpreting "unfair or deceptive
acts or practices" through enforcement actions, including
settlements.8 8
Through this history of enforcement, the FTC has found many
kinds of actions to be deceptive or unfair. Classic deceptions
include false or misleading statements or implications, for
instance about a product's price, quality, or features.8 9 In the
contexts of privacy and data security, the FTC extended these
cases to cover false promises to protect users' private information,
or false implications that the company will do so;90 trickery like
telling people they need to download a piece of malicious "security"
software or disclose confidential information when they don't
really need to do so;91 disclosures of privacy practices that are
(noting that Congress intentionally chose vague language in 1914 and 1938 "because
business practices and technology were constantly evolving, causing new problems that
Congress could not quickly act to remedy").
86.
Letter from James C. Miller HI, Chairman, FTC, to John D. Dingell, Chairman,
House Comm. on Energy & Commerce (Oct. 14, 1983), reprinted in Cliffdale Assocs., Inc.,
103 F.T.C. 110 app. at 174-75 (1984) (decision & order).
87.
15 U.S.C. § 45(n); see also Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. at 244 n.5; LabMD,
Inc. v. FTC, 894 F.3d 1221, 1227-29 (11th Cir. 2018) (suggesting, in dictum, that this
statutory definition might add to, rather than supplant, previous FTC interpretations
requiring that an allegedly unfair trade practice "offend[] public policy as established by
statute, the common law, or [the Constitution]") (citing Unfair or Deceptive Advertising
and Labeling of Cigarettes in Relation to the Health Hazards of Smoking, 29 Fed. Reg.
8324, 8355 (July 2, 1964) (codified at 16 C.F.R. § 408)).
88.
See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common
Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 606-08 (2014) (arguing that the FTC's privacy
enforcement actions, and especially its settlements, have developed a body of law akin to a
common law of privacy).
89.
Letter from James C. Miller III, supra note 86, app. at 182-83; see also 1
STEPHANIE W. KANWIT, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

§ 4.04

(2018).

90.
See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 88, at 628-30; see also, e.g., Wyndham
Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d at 240-42 (lawsuit alleging that Wyndham used inadequate
data-security practices, in violation of promises to protect customers' information, leading
to a data breach); LabMD, Inc., 894 F.3d at 1224-29 (similar); Eli Lilly & Co., 133 F.T.C.
763, 766-68 (2002) (complaint alleging that Eli Lilly disclosed customers' personal
information in violation of privacy policy).
91.
E.g., FTC v. Ross, 743 F.3d 886, 889-90 (4th Cir. 2014) (affirming judgment in
favor of the FTC when defendants ran ads claiming that victims' computers had been
scanned and were infected with malware when in fact no scans had been run); Default
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inadequate or too vague to meaningfully inform consumers about
how their data is used; 92 and even failure to follow industry
standards when a company's statements and behavior otherwise
implied that they will do so.93 Actions the FTC has found to be
unfair include hiding price information to make it hard to compare
prices across vendors; 94 bringing creditor lawsuits in distant and
inconvenient forums;95 refusing to refund the value of repossessed
cars beyond the amount owed on a bad car loan; 96 designing

Judgment and Order for Permanent Injunction and Monetary Judgment as to Defendant
Innovative Marketing, Inc. at 2-5, FTC v. Innovative Mktg., Inc., No. 08-CV-3233-RDB (D.
Md. Feb. 24, 2010) (order granting default judgment on similar facts); First Amended
Complaint for Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief at 2, 6-8, FTC v. Enternet Media, Inc.,
No. CVO5-7777 CAS (C.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2005) (seeking a temporary restraining order when
defendants distributed code to embed free-music widgets in webpages, when the widgets
also offered to "upgrade" users' browsers and actually installed spyware).
92.
E.g., Complaint at *7-9, Facebook, Inc., No. C-4365, 2011 WL 7096348 (F.T.C.
Nov. 29, 2011) (complaint alleging that Facebook's Privacy Wizard did not adequately
disclose that users could no longer restrict access to certain information and that previous
decisions to do so would no longer be honored); Complaint at *2-7, Google Inc., No. C-4336,
2011 WL 5089551 (F.T.C. Oct. 13, 2011) (complaint alleging that Google's privacy policies
and the setup process for a Google Buzz account were too vague to place users on notice
that certain information would be publicly shared by default); see also FED. TRADE COMM'N,
PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE 27 (2012), https://www.ftc.go

v/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-report-protecting-consum
[https://perma.cc/
er-privacy-era-rapid-change-recommendations/120326privacyreport.pdf
92HE-7NRK] ("The Commission recognizes the need for flexibility to permit innovative new
uses of data that benefit consumers. At the same time, in order to protect consumer privacy,
there must be some reasonable limit on the collection of consumer data. General statements
in privacy policies, however, are not an appropriate tool to ensure such a limit because
companies have an incentive to make vague promises that would permit them to do
virtually anything with consumer data.").
93.
E.g., Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d at 241 (lawsuit alleging that
Wyndham falsely claimed that "[w]e safeguard our Customers' personally identifiable
information by using industry standard practices"); Complaint at *3-5, Uber Techs., Inc.,
File No. 152-3054, 2017 WL 3621176 (F.T.C. Aug. 15, 2017) (complaint alleging that Uber
repeatedly falsely stated and implied that it used state-of-the-art industry-standard
security practices, allowing an intruder to gain access to user data hosted on Amazon cloud
servers).

94.
E.g., Funeral Industry Practices, 16 C.F.R. §§ 453.1-453.2 ("In selling or offering
to sell funeral goods or funeral services to the public, it is an unfair or deceptive act or
practice for a funeral provider to fail to furnish accurate price information disclosing the
cost to the purchaser for each of the specific funeral goods and funeral services used in
connection with the disposition of deceased human bodies . .. to persons inquiring about
the purchase of funerals.").
95.
Spiegel, Inc. v. FTC, 540 F.2d 287, 291, 293-94 (7th Cir. 1976) (holding that the
FTC could find it unfair to sue consumers in distant and inconvenient forums even when
the forums had jurisdiction over the cases).
96.
E.g., In re Gen. Motors Corp., [1979-1983 Transfer Binder] 12 Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) ¶ 21,665 (F.T.C. June 11, 1980) (proposing to create a $2 million fund for consumers
whose cars were repossessed and did not receive any surplus owed); In re Ford Motor Co.,
[1976-1979 Transfer Binder] 12 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 21,477 (F.T.C. Oct. 15, 1978)
(requiring this surplus to be paid within forty-five days).
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software that made it unduly difficult for users to protect their
privacy;9 7 and, again, failure to follow industry data-security

standards.98
Though they use a variety of linguistic formulations,
academics in several fields have likewise focused on actions that
take advantage of victims in these ways. Susser, Roessler, and
Nissenbaum, for instance, start with three disparate problemstargeted advertising aimed at teenagers, gig-economy platforms
like Uber that nudge their workers to do things that benefit the
platform, and the use of detailed personality profiles in election
targeting-and argue that they are examples of the same
phenomenon, manipulation. 9 9 They define manipulation as
"imposing a hidden or covert influence on another person's
decision-making . . . . by targeting and exploiting their cognitive,
emotional, or other decision-making vulnerabilities" and conclude
that it differs from other ways of affecting someone's decision, like
persuasion and coercion. 100 In persuasion, one offers arguments or
incentives to try to get a decision maker to make a preferred
choice; in coercion one eliminates all but the desired option. Both
of these tools, then, are in some sense honest means of getting
someone to act: the decision maker understands what options are
available and can make a choice or not, with full knowledge of the
choices. With manipulation, though, the manipulator subverts
this capacity for self-government through some sort of hidden
influence, unknown to the decision maker. This can be as simple
as lying or deceiving the decision maker, so that she acts on the
basis of information that is incomplete or wrong. But there are
other ways to manipulate someone. Susser, Roessler, and
Nissenbaum highlight manipulations that take advantage of
cognitive biases or forms of bounded rationality, or that capitalize
on other "psychological levers," like people's individual emotions
or desires.10 1
Akerlof and Shiller's description of "phishing,"102 likewise,
shares much with the Susser, Roessler, and Nissenbaum
97.
E.g., Complaint TT 25-32, FTC v. FrostWire LLC, No. 1:11-cv-23643 (S.D. Fla.
Oct. 7, 2011) (alleging that FrostWire designed its file-sharing software to make it unfairly
difficult for consumers to avoid sharing certain categories of personal files by requiring
them to opt out on a file-by-file basis); Stipulated Final Order for Permanent Injunction,
FTC v. FrostWire LLC, No. 11-23643-CV-GRAHAM (S.D. Fla. Oct. 12, 2011) (stipulated
permanent injunction).
98.
E.g., Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d at 246-49.
Susser et al., supra note 6, at 3-9.
99.
Id. at 22.
100.
Id. at 15, 18.
101.
AKERLOF & SHILLER, supra note 75, at xi.
102.
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description of manipulation and the account of scams I develop
here. The classic form of phishing on the internet is a scam where
someone sends an e-mail pretending to be from a major company
or bank, hoping the recipient will provide real login information
on a fake login page. Akerlof and Shiller generalize the term:
It is about getting people to do things that are in the interest
of the phisherman, but not in the interest of the target. It is
about angling, about dropping an artificial lure into the
water and sitting and waiting as wary fish swim by, make an
error, and get caught. 103
Like manipulation, phishing takes advantage of a victim's error
and induces that error through lying or deception or just taking
advantage of cognitive biases or emotions. Akerlof and Shiller do
go farther, arguing that someone can phish even when nothing is
hidden from the victim, though the difference is largely one of
degree rather than kind. 10 4 Gambling addiction is a key example:
An addict might know intellectually exactly what was going on but
be emotionally incapable of stopping. Because casinos can design
and select slot machines and games that capitalize on, and
reinforce, whatever levers lead one to become addicted, they
represent a lure that seeks to take advantage of a vulnerable
victim, even if the victim knows it.105 The point applies more
broadly, though, any time people's "real" tastes and their "monkeyon-the-shoulder" tastes diverge-which is pretty much always.10 6
The practices characteristic of scams can take many forms,
but they all seek to take advantage of a victim by causing her to
act contrary to her own interests. In the "Dinner with Trump"
scam discussed in the introduction, for instance, the scam used two
sources of deception to extract money from donors. The name of
the website-dinnerwithtrump.org-suggested a prize that many
people would assume could only be provided by the Trump
campaign. The website's design also mimicked the campaign site's,
suggesting an affiliation. 107 Even if a savvy consumer could have
read the fine print and discovered that an unaffiliated PAC ran
the site, the website was nevertheless apparently designed to
solicit contributions from those who would voluntarily give to the
Trump campaign. It took advantage of the natural and predictable
103.
104.

Id.
Id. at ix-xi.

Id.; see also NATASHA Dow SCHOLL, ADDICTION BY DESIGN: MACHINE GAMBLING
105.
IN LAS VEGAS (2012).

106.

See AKERLOF & SHILLER, supra note 75, at 20-22.
Cf. WOODROw HARTZOG, PRIVACY'S BLUEPRINT: THE BATTLE TO CONTROL THE
DESIGN OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES 21-55 (2018) (explaining how visual design implicitly
conveys messages to users).
107.
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assumptions made by those who saw the PAC's ads to cause people
who would not want to donate money to the PAC to go ahead and
do so. It caused donors to act, contrary to their natural preferences,
by misleading them and capitalizing on limited attention and
cognitive biases.
As the gambling example makes clear, the line between a
scam and a normal transaction can be blurry. Just as regulators
and academics haven't agreed on a single vocabulary for
discussing scams, there is no universal agreement on when a
transaction is scammy enough to cross that threshold. Is it a scam
when a seller prices a good at $9.99 instead of $10? When the seller
hires attractive salespeople? When the seller advertises a heavily
discounted product but then steers interested consumers to more
expensive options? When the seller claims the good is "top quality"
when it's really average? When the seller targets inebriated
buyers or provides free drinks? All of these practices have some of
the hallmarks of scams, due to deception or some effort to
capitalize on a cognitive bias or vulnerability. They're also all
common, usually noncontroversial commercial practices. Yet it is
not hard to imagine more problematic versions of each, and
regardless, it matters less which specific practices amount to
scams and more that some clearly do. When a company misleads
consumers about a product's price, quality, or features, it can
cause customers who would not otherwise have purchased the
product to do so. When a hotel chain claims it keeps customers'
information secure but really leaves it on an out-of-date computer
that hasn't received security updates in three years, securityconscious customers who would otherwise seek to avoid the
security risk might stay in the chain's hotels.1 0 8 When the
pharmaceutical industry seeks to keep prices opaque, customers
can't easily find the cheapest pharmacy at which to fill a
prescription, and so will pay more for their prescriptions. 109
2. Scammers and Victims. A scam is a transaction (or an
attempt to form a transaction) and so requires at least two parties,
a scammer and a victim. Scammers come from all walks of life;
their common feature is that they try to get something from others
and choose scams as their mechanism to do so. If there is money
to be made or advantage to be taken, simple economics suggest

See FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 241, 245-46 (3d Cir. 2015).
108.
109.
See, e.g., Kaitlyn N. Dana et al., Drug Pricing Transparency: The New Retail
Revolution, 52 HOSP. PHARMACY 155, 156, 158 (2017) (arguing that a payer's access to more
transparent pricing information may improve autonomy and optimize pricing negotiations).
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that someone will take it; scammers are just those who have
chosen to do so.
Victims are more interesting because many scams rely on
exploiting the vulnerabilities of their victims. Scams commonly
target the elderly or poor, recent immigrants, international
tourists, even children. There are two big reasons for this.
Members of vulnerable populations are, in many cases, more likely
than others to fall for a scam. At the same time, they can also be
less likely to report the scam or otherwise respond after the scam,
reducing the scammer's risk.
There are many reasons a victim might fall for a scam. The
elderly, for instance, are disproportionately likely to suffer from
declining mental capacity as conditions like Alzheimer's disease
and dementia set in. They are also more likely to be widowed or
have family that have moved away, which can make them
vulnerable to emotional manipulation. 110 Immigrants and tourists,
in contrast, can be vulnerable, not because they suffer from any
conditions or impairments, but because they are less familiar with
the language and culture of an area. When that's the case, a
seemingly friendly hand can exploit their unfamiliarity with the
culture. Victims may also be reluctant to report scams to
authorities for fear of drawing attention to themselves.'1 1 Indeed,
some victims may be vulnerable specifically because they have no
redress. For instance, the customers of Ashley Madison, a dating
site for married people looking to cheat, were targeted by
scammers after the site's customer database was stolen and
published.112
Tourists are a notable example of vulnerable victims, for two
reasons. First, they demonstrate that the specific vulnerabilities
used by scammers can be context-specific; everyone is vulnerable
at one time or another. Second, they demonstrate the ways that
110.
See, e.g., Carolyn L. Dessin, FinancialAbuse of the Elderly, 36 IDAHO L. REV. 203,
221 (2000); Shelby A.D. Moore & Jeanette Schaefer, Remembering the Forgotten Ones:
Protecting the Elderly from FinancialAbuse, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 505, 517-19 (2004);
Seymour Moskowitz, Saving Granny from the Wolf Elder Abuse and Neglect-The Legal
Framework, 31 CONN. L. REV. 77, 99-101 (1998).
111.
See, e.g., Mara H. Gottfried, St. Paul Immigrants, Don't Be Afraid to Call Us,
Police Say in 4 Languages, TwlN CITIES PIONEER PRESS (Nov. 30, 2016, 5:11 PM), http://ww
w.twincities.com/2016/11/30/st-paul-immigrants-dont-be-afraid-to-call-us-police-say-in-4-1
anguages/ [https://perma.cc/B2TY-SQMR]. But see Mary Bowerman, Woman Calls Police
Over Drug Dealer's 'Outrageous'Price Hike, USA TODAY (Jan. 31, 2017, 8:20 AM), http://
www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2017/01/31/woman-calls-police-over-drug-deale
rs-outrageous-price-hike/97275774/ [https://perma.cc/6VTQ-3SF6].
112.
E.g., Aimee Picchi, Ashley Madison Hack Leads to Scams, Extortion, CBS
MONEYWATCH (Aug. 24, 2015, 12:49 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/scams-extortionattempts-arising-from-ashley-madison-hack/ [https//perma.cc/NB7L-UFFM].
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scams can rely on assumptions and context cues to trick their
victims, rather than specific false claims. Because many people
hesitate to ask too many questions or seem too skeptical, a
scammer can take advantage of a victim's willingness to fill in the
gaps and make assumptions about good faith. 113 A common travel
scam, for instance, involves locals who offer to act as tour guides
for foreign visitors. At the end of the day, they propose a tea
ceremony or celebratory dinner or some other special meal at a
local restaurant for which they can vouch. When the tourists get
the bill at the end of the meal, it is much higher than it should
be-often by multiple orders of magnitude.1 14 The victim tourists
are in an environment where they are out of their comfort zones,
so the friendly face of a guide can make them feel at ease. Once
they let down their guard, the tourist can make implicit
assumptions based on prior experiences-that a restaurant
charges reasonable prices or would go out of business; that a
friendly guide wouldn't take them to an overpriced restaurantonly to get scammed. The tourist's vulnerabilities-not speaking
the language, not knowing their way around, wanting to trust a
friendly face-are used against them.
The need to target vulnerable victims can help explain some
of the more inexplicable features of some scams. Nigerian e-mail
scams, for instance, famously use broken English and stories of
riches so implausible that it can be hard to imagine anyone falls
for them. The math suggests, though, that this feature of the scam
is key for it to work. 115 Sending spam e-mail is basically free, but
interacting with a recipient who responds to the scam takes time.
Consequently, scammers need to filter out as many false positives
as they can. 116 By making their e-mails nakedly implausible, then,
scammers deter all but the most truly gullible marks from
responding-and those are precisely the recipients who are most
likely to fall for the scam. Scammers can spend their time

E.g., Kit Yarrow, The Science of Why We Fall for Scams That Are So Obviously
113.
Scams, MONEY (Nov. 11, 2016), http://money.com/money/4568127/scams-psychology-whyvictims-fall-tech-support-irs-facebook/ [https://perma.cc/A8X7-A3S5] (quoting one victim
who explained, "[in retrospect I can see that I just kept filling in blanks and making
assumptions instead of challenging what I was hearing").
114.
E.g., Kelsey Blodget, The 9 Surprising Travel Scams You Need to Know About,
OYSTER (Apr. 29, 2017), https://www.oyster.com/articles/45965-the-9-surprising-travel-sca
ms-you-need-to-know-about/ [https://perma.cclX84Y-PBF5].
115.
CORMAC HERLEY, WHY Do NIGERIAN SCAMMERS SAY THEY ARE FROM NIGERIA?
11-12 (2012), https://www.microsoft.comlen-us/research/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Why
FromNigeria.pdf [https://perma.cc/F6CQ-6LAA].
116.
Id.
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interacting with victims who might pay off instead of those who
won't.
This reasoning is not limited to Nigerian e-mail scams or
illegal scams in general; "legitimate" businesses use it as well. For
instance, some car dealers use direct-mail flyers promoting
contests with implausibly generous prizes that can only be won if
a customer comes into a dealership.1 17 Dealers use this form of ex
post targeting or filtering to bring especially gullible customers
into the business so they can sell them new cars. Savvy consumers,
sensing an implausible offer, throw the flyers away; ones who are
more likely to overpay for a car come in to see if they've won
something.
There are many other vulnerabilities that scammers seek to
exploit. Many victims are desperate, whether for financial reasons
or health reasons or family reasons, looking for anything that
might solve problems. Many victims let down their guard when
dealing with authority figures, or expert figures like tech-support
workers, or scammers pretending to be these things.11 8 Many
victims follow ordinary social cues, which scammers can exploit,
like feeling obligated to repay previous favors or gifts or not to say
no to polite requests. Many victims are bored or greedy or lonely.
Some victims don't seem very vulnerable at all but fall victim to
scams that exploit their exposure to risk. Many investment scams,
for instance, target successful, middle-aged, financially literate
investment
for
the
market
in
professionals-people
opportunities. 119 Indeed, some vulnerabilities don't even look like
vulnerabilities; one study found that simply spending time in
online chat rooms increased adolescents' vulnerability to

117.
As one finance manager explained on a Reddit forum where salespeople answer
car buyers' questions:
[Dealers that send out these promotions are] probably looking to scrape the bottom
of the market. These mailers aren't typically targeting the smartest buyers, they
want the impulse shoppers and people who are easily swayed by shiny things.
Most educated consumers will either toss it in the recycle bin or post to a forum
like this rather than waste the trip to the store. Of the few that do, some will cuss
and make a scene, a couple will post reviews-but at the end of the day the dealer
looks at it as a numbers game. Unfortunate, and I'm glad I no longer work for a
place that runs these.
TheRealMeatloaf, Comment to IJust "Won" a 60" TVon a Scratch-Off Mass Mailer, What
Am I In For, REDDIT: R/ASKCARSALES (Apr. 17, 2018, 3:25 PM), https://reddit.com/r/askcarsa
les/comments/8cr8k2/ijust won a_60_tvon-a_scratchoffmassmailer/dxj2xrr/ [https://p
erma.cc/SZC9-ERJ8].
118.
E.g., Yarrow, supra note 113.
119.
E.g., Marilyn Lewis, 10 Types of People Who Fall for Scams, Schemes and Cons,
MONEYTALKSNEws (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.moneytalksnews.com/10-types-people-who
-fall-for-scams-schemes-and-cons/ [https://perma.cc/YJ9N-UIJCS].
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victimization because they were more exposed to predatory
behavior the more time they spent online. 120 And so forth-there's
no shortage of vulnerabilities scammers can use to extract money
from their victims, or clever scammers looking for ways to do so.
3. Legal and Illegal Scams. Although many scams violate
the law, there are enough that are legal, or that are not clearly
illegal, that existing law is not a reliable solution to the problem
of targeted scams. Many scams violate existing laws against fraud;
many others amount to deceptive or unfair trade practices that
violate the FTC Act. Some can amount to larceny or various other
crimes or torts. But some scams don't fall into these buckets, and
it's not clear that they ever could.
There are many reasons a scam might not violate the law.
Sometimes there are simply gaps in the law, whether due to
failure to anticipate a scam or due to the structure of a regulatory
scheme. Election scams like the "Dinner with Trump" scam are a
good example of the latter. Federal law sets out the requirements
for a political action committee to operate, which include
registering with the Federal Election Commission, disclosing the
names of donors who give more than $200 in a calendar year,
reporting how the committee spends its money, and filing periodic
reports with the FEC.1 21 Notably, federal law also governs the
contents of fundraising solicitations, requiring that they contain
specific disclaimers about who is soliciting money, how it will be
used, and who paid for the solicitation. 1 2 2 Those requirements,
however, serve different goals than laws like the FTC Act or
criminal fraud law, seeking to further transparency and encourage
political participation, while keeping a distance between
campaigns and independent committees. 123 This means that while
a fundraising solicitation might be deceptive or unfair by the
standards of the FTC Act, it might be fine as a matter of federal
election law so long as the fundraiser filed all the necessary FEC
paperwork and made the proper disclosures. Indeed, in 2014, the
FEC concluded that it should take no action against a PAC quite
120.
Catherine D. Marcum et al., PotentialFactors of Online Victimization of Youth.
An Examination of Adolescent Online Behaviors Utilizing Routine Activity Theory,
31 DEvIANT BEHAV. 381, 395-98 (2010).
121.
See 52 U.S.C. §§ 30102(c), 30103(a), 30104 (Supp. V 2018); 11 C.F.R. §§ 100.1116.11, 300.1-300.72, 9001.1-9039.3 (2019); FED. ELECTION COMM'N, CAMPAIGN GUIDE:
NONCONNECTED COMMITTEES 3, 41-42, 47 (2008), http://www.fec.gov/pdfInongui.pdf [http
s://perma.ccl9MXK-FTXS].
122.
See 52 U.S.C. § 30120(a); 11 C.F.R. § 110.11.
123.
See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 120-32 (2003); Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 66-68 (1976) (per curiam).
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similar to American Horizons-this time the plot centered around
Congressional candidate Allen West-because it concluded that
the conduct was not "a fraud within the reach of the [Federal
Election Campaign] Act or Commission regulation." 1 2 4 This is not
an isolated incident; scammers have shifted from running scam
charities to running scam political committees because they're less
heavily regulated. 125
Gaps like the one between election law and other anti-fraud
and consumer-protection laws can be closed, whether through
legislation, changes in judicial interpretation, or changes in
agency interpretation or priorities. Indeed, in rejecting the West
campaign's complaint, the FEC was careful to note that whether
the PAC's activities were "prohibited by laws beyond the Act,
criminal or otherwise, [was] not a matter within the Commission's
jurisdiction." 1 2 6 The Federal Trade Commission recently started
stepping in, going after companies that provide campaign
services. 127 Even if the campaigns themselves are likely not
Factual and Legal Analysis at 1-2, Republican Majority Campaign PAC, MUR
124.
6633 (F.E.C. Mar. 7, 2014), https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/murs/6633/14044352160.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DFY6-FG72]. In that case, the PAC raised money with fundraisers saying
things like "[ilt's up to us to Save Allen West" and "[h]elp Allen West win over the thousands
of voters in his new Congressional district who have only been exposed to what they have
heard in the media, and from his detractors. It's time for us to give them the truth about
Allen West." Id. But the PAC spent almost nothing to help West's campaign. Complaint at
1, 3, Republican Majority Campaign PAC, MUR 6633 (F.E.C. Aug. 23, 2012),
2
[https://perma.cc/E7M4-5LH
https://www.fec.gov/files/legallmurs/6633/1404435 1 10.pdf
A]. The FEC observed that "[t]he record leaves little doubt that the [PAC] sought to use
Representative West's likeness to raise funds independently to support his candidacy" and
"it appears that the [PAC] spent very little of the money it raised to support West." It
nevertheless concluded that the fundraiser didn't violate election law. Factual and Legal
Analysis, supra.
See Maggie Severns & Scott Bland, 'Scam PACs'Rake in Millions Under Guise of
125.
Charity, POLITICO (May 4, 2018, 5:04 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/05/04/scam49
1 [https://perma.cc/4KJH-JR6
pacs-political-action-committees-charity-investigation-568
6] ("A POLITICO investigation finds operators under scrutiny for suspicious charity
practices moving into politics, where election regulators have little power over them."). In
addition to the different goals of federal election and consumer-protection law, charities are
also more susceptible to regulation and enforcement actions because there are more
regulators; states routinely regulate charities while playing little or no role in regulating
federal elections. See, e.g., Press Release, FTC, FTC Announces Operation False Charity
2
Law Enforcement Sweep (May 20, 2009), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/
009/05/ftc-announces-operation-false-charity-law-enforcement-sweep [https://perma.cc/HA
6J-ARTZ].
Factual and Legal Analysis, supra note 124, at 1.
126.
See, e.g., Complaint at 4-5, United States v. InfoCision, Inc., No. 5:18-cv-00064
127.
(N.D. Ohio Jan. 10, 2018) (settling with a telemarketing firm that allegedly violated the
Telemarketing Sales Rule); Maggie Severns & Derek Willis, How Conservative Operatives
Steered Millions in PAC Donations to Themselves, POLITICO (July 26, 2019, 5:04 AM),
https://www.politico.com/story/2019/07/26/conservative-majority-fund-political-fundraisin
g-pac-kelley-rogers-1428260 [https://perma.cc/86WV-94V6] (discussing how InfoCision
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"commerce" within the meaning of the FTC Act, the campaign
process is still subject to some FTC regulation.
These gaps can be hard or impossible to close. Sometimes this
is because a regulatory scheme legitimately prioritizes different
goals than avoiding scams. The caller-ID system is a good
example. When a telephone call is placed, the phone company
serving the recipient pays a fraction of a penny to look up the
caller's name in a caller-ID database. Scammers have exploited
this fact by colluding with database providers to make money from
millions of robocalls. 128 When recipients look up the dialer's
number (or forged number), the database provider collects a
fraction of a penny and kicks some of that back to the number's
owner. This means that the caller makes money even if no one ever
answers the calls because the payment comes when the recipient
phone company performs an automatic database lookup while
connecting the call. Because reliable universal service is the
overriding goal of the phone system, though, phone companies
have been reluctant to try to filter out these robocalls. 129
Other times, regulatory gaps and loopholes aren't closed
because the political process makes it impossible to do so, even if
there is little good reason. The dietary-supplement industry in the
United States is a good example. Vitamins, minerals, herbs, amino
acids, and other dietary supplements are a $37 billion industry in
the United States, even though most of those products haven't
been shown to provide any benefit at all, and even though some of
them can be actively harmful. 130 Under the Dietary Supplement
Health and Education Act, sellers can make claims like "great for
joint health!" so long as they include a disclaimer saying "This
provided services to political committees and the FTC's responsive actions).
128.
See, e.g., Complaint at 5-6, FTC v. Caribbean Cruise Line, Inc., No. 0:15-cv-60423
(S.D. Fla. Mar. 3, 2015); Sarah Krouse, Why Robocallers Win Even if You Don't Answer,
WALL ST. J. (June 4, 2018, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-robocallers-win-eve
n-if-you-dont-answer-1528104600 [https://perma.cc/YXX5-Z28K; John D. McKinnon, FCC
Fines Man $120 Million for His 100 Million Robocalls, WALL ST. J. (June 22, 2017, 6:18
PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/fcc-proposes- 120-million-fine-against-miami-telemarket
er-1498152920 [https://perma.ccLLV7-6FYJI.
129.
Merrit Kennedy, FCC Wants Phone Companies to Start Blocking Robocalls By
Default, NPR (May 15, 2019, 7:14 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/05/15/723569324/fccwants-phone-companies-to-start-blocking-robocalls-by-default
[https://perma.cc/59GT-HM
6X]; see also CONSUMER & GOv'T AFFAIRS BUREAU, FED. COMMC'NS COMM'N, CG DOCKET

No. 17-59, REPORT ON ROBOCALLS 7 & n.33 (2019), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/
DOC-356196A1.pdf [https:/perma.cclP7YY-H4WV] (discussing the Commission's prior
reluctance to allow call blocking).
130.
See, e.g., Erin Brodwin, The $37 Billion Supplement Industry Is Barely
Regulated-and It's Allowing Dangerous Products to Slip Through the Cracks, Bus.
INSIDER (Nov. 8, 2017, 2:58 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/supplements-vitaminsbad-or-good-health-2017-8 [https://perma.cc/8KCE-4MRRJ.
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statement has not been evaluated by the Food and Drug
Administration. This product is not intended to diagnose, treat,
cure, or prevent any disease." 13 1 The Act, which effectively
deregulated health claims made by supplement manufacturers,
was a public-choice triumph, with a powerful industry successfully
overcoming strenuous objections from the Food and Drug
132
Administration and essentially legalizing scam supplements.
Scams that depend on violating consumer expectations, not
express representations, likewise might be legally fine, or hard for
agencies or law-enforcement officials to pursue. Another common
telephone scam, for instance, works because the telephone country
code for the United States, +1, also covers Canada and most
Caribbean nations. A phone number from one of those nations
looks to an American like a domestic phone number in an
unfamiliar area code like 242 (the Bahamas), 649 (the Turks and
Caicos), or 784 (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines). A customer,
then, who misses a call that appears to come from a random
domestic number, and calls it back, may actually be calling a
foreign country. Calls to foreign nations are, of course, not
domestic calls, and can be far more expensive than customers
expect. A scammer can exploit this misunderstanding by setting
up an auto-dialer in a foreign country (or domestically, using
forged caller-ID info) that charges high fees for inbound calls;
calling random American telephone numbers and hanging up
before anyone answers; waiting for callers to return the calls; and
trying to keep those callers on the phone for as long as possible,
collecting charges on the order of several dollars per minute for
calls that callers expect to be free. 133 Exploiting this kind of
misunderstanding or expectations mismatch is the basis for lots of
scams, and much of the time there's nothing illegal about it.134
Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-417,
131.
108 Stat. 4325, 4329 (1994) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(6) (2012)).

§

6,

See, e.g., U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-662T, HERBAL DIETARY
132.
SUPPLEMENTS: EXAMPLES OF DECEPTIVE OR QUESTIONABLE MARKETING PRACTICES AND

POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS ADVICE 1, 13-14 (2010) (testimony of Gregory D. Kutz,
Managing Director, Forensic Audits and Special Investigations); Margaret Gilhooley,
Deregulation and the Administrative Role: Looking at Dietary Supplements, 62 MONT. L.
REV. 85, 93-95 (2001); Arlene Weintraub, Dietary Supplements: Latest Government Uproar
No Match for Industry Lobbying Money, CBS NEWS (June 1, 2010, 4:30 PM), https://www.c
bsnews.com/news/dietary-supplements-latest-government-uproar-no-match-for-industrylobbying-money/ [https://perma.cc/C234-STKF].
E.g., Kristin Wong, Phone Calls from These Area Codes Might Be a Scam,
133.
LIFEHACKER (Mar. 10, 2017, 1:30 PM), https:/flifehacker.com/phone-calls-from-these-areacodes-might-be-a-scam-1793107601 [https://perma.cc/YYC3-QHSL].
One more example, just for fun. Murano glass is a term that technically includes
134.
hand-blown glass made on the Italian island of Murano, just outside Venice. It's often used,
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The bottom line, then, is that laws against scams might
inevitably be an incomplete solution. Even when those problems
can be overcome and laws can be well tailored to address scams,
they may nevertheless fail to address the problem because
targeting itself can make it easier to scam people, as discussed in
the next Section.
B. How TargetingPlatforms FacilitateScams
Just as the combination of more data and better targeting
made advertising more efficient, it also made it easier and more
efficient for scammers to scam people.
No one theory explains when and why scams occur, but
criminologists have developed numerous helpful approaches. One
of those theories, routine activity theory, provides a positive model
of the ways that changes to an environment affect the rate of
criminal activity. (Though not all scams are crimes, the theory
nevertheless provides a useful lens for looking at scams because
the effects of environmental changes should be similar for the two
overlapping categories.) Routine activity theory suggests that
three things must converge for a crime to occur: a motivated
offender, a suitable target, and the absence of a "capable
guardian[]" to prevent the crime.13 5 When something changes and
these convergences happen more often, the amount of crime can
be expected to rise. For instance, if social patterns change such
that people stay home less often and go out to dinner more often,
the number of home burglaries might rise in response, because the
though, to refer to certain styles of glass, so lots of shops in Murano and elsewhere in Italy
sell glassware and art that looks like Murano glass and carries prominent "made in Italy"
stickers. Sometimes these stickers are lies and a piece has been mass-produced elsewhere,
but sometimes an item is made in Italy-just not on Murano, which matters to collectors.
When a piece actually is made in Italy, such a sticker seeks to capitalize on the mismatch
between consumers' understanding or expectations-the assumption that something made
in Italy is real Murano glass-and the legally required disclosure, which just reports the
country of origin. To fight back against this scam, genuine Murano glassmakers have
developed a distinctive logo and educational campaign, with real pieces labeled with a
sticker containing the logo and a data-matrix code leading to a website providing
information about the piece and its maker. By working to realign consumers' expectations
with reality, the genuine Murano glassmakers reduce the effectiveness of the scam, or at
least divide the market so that savvy shoppers willing to pay for the real thing can do so
without fear. See, e.g., Guide, MURANO GLAss, http://www.muranoglass.com/en/guide/
[https://perma.cc/RC2W-XFKU] (last visited Sept. 12, 2019); Chiara Vasarri, Venice
Glassmakers'AncientArt Shattered by Slump, Taxes, BLOOMBERG BUSINESsWEEK (Dec. 1,
2014), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-12-01/venice-glassmakers-ancient-a
rt-shattered-by-weak-demand-taxes [https://perma.ccIY8Z5-S4RF].
135.
Routine activity theory was originally described in Lawrence E. Cohen & Marcus
Felson, Social Change and Crime Rate Trends: A Routine Activities Approach, 44 AM. Soc.
REV. 588, 589-90 (1979).
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three factors that must converge for a home burglary to occur will
come together more often. The theory provides useful predictions
about changes in the rates of certain crimes, especially ones
characterized by their opportunistic or predatory natures. 136
Targeting makes it easier to scam people online because it
makes it easier for these convergences to occur and for scams to
succeed when they do occur. It does this by making three things
easier for scammers: targeting their victims, hiding from
platforms and law enforcement, and developing better and moreeffective scams in the first place.
1. Better Targeting. Just as with advertising, better
targeting helps scammers because it makes it easier to reach
potential victims, the intended consumers of the scam. Targeting
doesn't necessarily do this by increasing the number of times that
a motivated scammer, suitable target, and lack of a capable
guardian converge; if scammers showed their ads to everyone
instead of targeting certain victims, then they would undoubtedly
find some victims who would not have been obvious targets. But
just as targeting makes advertising cheaper and more efficient, it
makes it cheaper and more efficient for a scammer to reach the
best potential victims. In the long run, this should result in more
scammers taking advantage of more victims, because some
additional scammers will enter the market when running a scam
is cheaper, while other scammers will get a better return on their
investment-target more promising victims-for a fixed budget.
The key difference between targeted advertising and targeted
scams is that targeting is useful for scammers in ways it isn't for
ordinary advertisers. To be sure, targeting is useful for scammers
for all the same reasons that apply to advertising. As discussed
before, with advertising, the usual goal of targeting is to choose
the demographics and other characteristics that reflect a
consumer's likelihood of buying an advertised product or
service.' 3 7 Rolex targets wealthy consumers; government
contractors target government employees; and so on. With better
Cohen and Felson discuss several empirical findings consistent with the theory.
136.
Id. at 594-604. The theory has since been tested in numerous studies. See generally Fawn
T. Ngo & Raymond Paternoster, Cybercrime Victimization: An Examination of Individual
and Situational Level Factors, 5 INT'L J. CYBER CRIMINOLOGY 773, 774-76 (2011) (citing
studies); see also TERANCE D. MIETHE & ROBERT F. MEIER, CRIME AND ITS SOCIAL CONTEXT:
TOWARD AN INTEGRATED THEORY OF OFFENDERS, VICTIMS, AND SITUATIONS 1-8 (Ronald A.

Farrell ed., 1994) (arguing that integrated theories that account for offenders' decisions to
engage in crime and victims' behaviors that increase their vulnerability to crime provide a
better account of crime levels than individual theories of criminality and victimization).
See supra Section I.B.
137.
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targeting, this can be improved-instead of all wealthy consumers,
Rolex might target those who have looked at the Rolex website or
read reviews of nice watches, or whose behavior indicates a
psychological tendency toward flashy goods like luxury watches,
or a trusting nature that might be easy to take advantage of38but the goal is still to target the consumers who are likely to be
interested in buying the advertised product. This form of targeting
works equally well for scams because scammers want to find the
consumers who would be interested in a scam, just like any
advertiser would. A scam purporting to offer investment
opportunities or manage household wealth might target wealthy
retirees, while a scam purporting to help first-time homebuyers
might target younger victims.

139

The goal is the same: to choose

the consumers most likely to respond to the message.
There are other reasons targeting is useful for scammers. For
one, scammers can use targeting to find the victims whose
vulnerabilities make them likely to fall for a scam-something
that's usually not the goal in ordinary advertising. All scams prey
on vulnerabilities of one kind or another; sometimes it's as simple
as creating a sense of urgency so the victim acts now instead of
carefully considering the offer and discussing it with others. 140 But
there are other, more-specific vulnerabilities that scammers seek
to exploit, and because these vulnerabilities aren't as universal as
responding emotionally to urgency, they benefit from targeting to
narrow the pool of potential victims.

138.
Cf. Jillian J. Turanovic & Travis C. Pratt, "Can't Stop, Won't Stop": Self-Control,
Risky Lifestyles, and Repeat Victimization, 30 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 29, 45-47
(2014) (finding that measures of self-control predict levels of repeat victimization,
suggesting that online psychological profiles could be used to identify potential victims);
Ngo & Paternoster, supra note 136, at 785-87 (finding a similar, but weaker, relationship
in online victimization); Gustavo S. Mesch & Guy Beker, Are Norms of Disclosureof Online
and Offline PersonalInformation Associated with the Disclosure of Personal Information
Online?, 36 HUM. COMm. RES. 570, 587-89 (2010) (finding that norms of personalinformation disclosure online and offline are only weakly related, suggesting that online
disclosure would be a promising avenue for identifying potential victims); Gustavo S.
Mesch, Is Online Trust and Trust in Social InstitutionsAssociated with Online Disclosure
of Identifiable Information Online?, 28 COMPUTERS IN HUM. BEHAV. 1471, 1476 (2012)
(containing similar findings); Marcum et al., supra note 120, at 395-98 (containing similar
findings).
139.
E.g., Common FraudSchemes: Investment Fraud, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/scams
-and-safety/common-fraud-schemes/investment-fraud [https://perma.cc/3J8W-VRD5] (last
visited Sept. 12, 2019); Stuart Ross & Russell G. Smith, Risk Factorsfor Advance Fee Fraud
Victimisation, TRENDS & ISSUES CRIME & CRIM. JUST., Aug. 2011, at 1, 4-5, https://aic.gov.a
u/publications/tandi/tandi420 [https://perma.cclTE2B-Z3GR].
140.
E.g., Yarrow, supra note 113 (observing that "the standard fraud playbook is to
create a sense of urgency, which elevates emotions and decreases rationality").
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Useful vulnerabilities could include any of a variety of
characteristics, depending on the scam; just as different kinds of
scams victimize different kinds of people, different kinds of scams
might rely on different kinds of online targeting to find different
kinds of vulnerabilities. A scammer pitching a fraudulent
subprime-mortgage or debt-consolidation scam, for instance,
might target consumers who are poor, in significant debt, or in
bankruptcy, or those who search Google for information about
payday lenders or visit their websites. These scams capitalize on
financial desperation, which can cause people to seek implausible
fixes if the obvious ones haven't worked. 141 Or, a scammer offering
get-rich-quick investment schemes might look for retirees with
substantial savings, capitalizing on vulnerabilities like cognitive
decline or loneliness. 142 Or such a scammer might look for people
who trade individual stocks and make a lot of trades, suggesting
that they become bored and are willing to change up their
investments looking for higher returns. 14 3 A scam selling a
Three FTC surveys of consumer fraud conducted between 2004 and 2011, for
141.
instance, found that consumers with incomes less than $40,000 were more likely to fall for
scams than those with higher incomes. See KEITH B. ANDERSON, FED. TRADE COMM'N,
CONSUMER FRAUD IN THE UNITED STATES: AN FTC SURVEY 59 (2004) [hereinafter
ANDERSON, AN FTC SURVEY]; KEITH B. ANDERSON, FED. TRADE COMM'N, CONSUMER FRAUD
IN THE UNITED STATES: THE SECOND FTC SURVEY 28 (2007) [hereinafter ANDERSON, THE
SECOND FTC SURVEY]; KEITH B. ANDERSON, FED. TRADE COMM'N, CONSUMER FRAUD IN THE
UNITED STATES, 2011: THE THIRD FTC SURVEY 50 (2013) [hereinafter ANDERSON, THE
THIRD FTC SURVEY].

For a useful overview of financial exploitation of the elderly, see Marguerite
142.
DeLiema & Kendon J. Conrad, FinancialExploitation of Older Adults, in ELDER ABUSE:
RESEARCH, PRACTICE AND POLICY 141 (XinQi Dong ed., 2017). DeLiema and Conrad review
several competing explanations for why scammers would target the elderly, including
declining health, isolation and undue influence, and increased opportunity for exploitation.
Id. at 143-46. Though each of these theories has some support, they have strikingly
different consequences. Notably, the evidence does not always back up the intuition that
elderly people are more likely to fall for scams; rather than being unusually vulnerable to
scams, they may simply be targeted more often, though it's hard to know for certain because
reporting rates are low. See id. at 144-45; Richard M. Titus et al., Victimization of Persons
by Fraud, 41 CRIME & DELINQ. 54, 60-62 (1995); ANDERSON, AN FTC SURVEY, supra note
141, at 68 ("Perhaps the most noteworthy finding here is that consumers aged 65 or over
do not appear to be at greater risk of being a victim than those who are somewhat younger.
Indeed, the cross-tab results suggest that seniors face the lowest risk of being a victim.");
ANDERSON, THE SECOND FTC SURVEY, supra note 141, at 40; ANDERSON, THE THIRD FTC
SURVEY, supra note 141, at 97-98.

143.

Cf. Kristy Holtfreter et al., Low Self-Control, Routine Activities, and Fraud

Victimization, 46 CRIMINOLOGY 189, 206-09 (2008) (finding no evidence that those with
weak self-control were more likely to be targeted, but that those who more frequently were
in situations where they could be targeted were indeed targeted more often); Gustavo S.

Mesch & Matias Dodel, Low Self-Control, Information Disclosure, and the Risk of Online
Fraud, 62 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 1356, 1366 (2018) (finding weak evidence that
"[i]ndividuals who indicate that they are willing to take risks on financial investments or
have accumulated more debt than they can handle are more likely to be targets" of scams).
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worthless cure might target people who search for information
about a particular disease, targeting a different kind of
desperation. Each of these targets a particular vulnerability that
only some people will have: poverty or desperation for a cure, or a
tolerance for risk and lack of self-control that leads one to
disregard conventional investment wisdom to find higher returns.
Whatever vulnerability a scammer seeks to exploit, targeting tools
make it much easier to identify individuals with that
vulnerability.
In one sense, this is no different than any other targeted
advertising. Both ordinary targeted advertising and targeted
scams look for the audiences that are believed to be most likely to
respond to the ad. There is a difference, though: while advertisers
ordinarily target demographics and characteristics that indicate
consumers who are likely to be interested in the advertised
products-in the usual case, presumably because they want that
product-scammers might instead choose demographics and
characteristics that indicate people who are predisposed to fall for
a particular scam. No one wants to fall for a scam, though; that's
part of what makes it a scam. 1 " This is essentially, then, a special
case of the general point about targeting groups with specific
demographics or other characteristics; the difference is that
there's no argument that targeting vulnerable victims has any
social value.
Another reason that targeting is useful for scammers is that
they can use targeting to find victims with specific beliefs instead
of specific vulnerabilities. This is another variant on targeting
groups with specific characteristics, but it opens new avenues of
persuasion for scammers. The "Dinner with Trump" scam is an
obvious example: by targeting individuals who supported Trump's
candidacy, the American Horizons PAC had an audience that
wanted to support the purported mission of the scam. 145 Likewise,
scams might target individuals with specific political, religious, or
144.
I set aside the case of someone who wants to fall for a scam, or is willing to do so,
for entertainment value or out of loneliness or out of a general taste for chaos. In those
cases, arguably the scam isn't a scam at all, because it's providing the victim some utility,
even if it's not the utility the scammer purports to provide.
145.
Politico reported, for instance, that every donor it reached who had given money
to American Horizons thought he or she was giving to the Trump campaign. Goldmacher,
supra note 1. One donor, contacted by Politico, said, "I feel ripped off and taken advantage
of. This is horrible. [Giving to an independent PAC] was not my intent." She added, "I want
my money back and I want them to add up what they stole from people and give it to Donald
Trump." Id. Another donor explained, "I had planned to give a thousand bucks to his
campaign, and when my wife saw it also on her Facebook feed she said, 'Why not do this?"'

Id.
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moral beliefs, and tailor the content of the scam to appeal to
victims with those beliefs. 146 This is a long-time technique used by
scammers. Indeed, the FBI warns that investment schemes "often
seek to victimize affinity groups-such as groups with a common
religion or ethnicity-to utilize the common interests to build trust
to effectively operate the investment fraud against them." 147
This kind of targeting has a few effects. One effect is that it
selects for individuals likely to respond to the scam; in this sense,
it is just like normal targeted advertising, which seeks to avoid
wasting money on people who don't want the advertised product.
Another is that it also makes the viewer more likely to fall for the
scam. A substantial body of psychological research demonstrates
that people are more likely to believe information that conforms to
their ideological priors, even if it is illogical, internally
contradictory, or unsupported by evidence.1 48 A scammer who
reinforces those priors, then, can take in victims who otherwise
wouldn't fall for the scam.
The result of all these forms of targeting is that scammers,
just like advertisers in general, can more efficiently reach the
individuals they want to reach without wasting money on
individuals who are less likely to pay off. While economic theory
offers a basis for thinking this efficiency might be socially valuable
in the case of advertising, 149 these arguments don't translate to
scams. Scams are a poor fit for the information theory of
advertising, almost by definition, because scams don't work when
victims have full information and because victims don't benefit
from falling for scams. Better information will just make the scam
harder to pull off.150 Scams are a much better fit for the persuasion

theory of advertising, with a scammer seeking to shape demand
146.
The nutritional-supplement industry-discussed above, see supra notes 130-32
and accompanying text-provides an especially striking example of how appeals can be
tailored to different groups of potential victims. For instance, both Alex Jones's Infowars
and Gwyneth Paltrow's Goop sell basically the same, largely worthless powders and pills
to very different audiences using very different branding and marketing. Nikhil Sonnad,
All the "Wellness" Products Americans Love to Buy Are Sold on Both Infowars and Goop,
QUARTZ (June 29, 2017), https://qz.com/1010684/all-the-wellness-products-american-loveto-buy-are-sold-on-both-infowars-and-goop/ [https://perma.ce/4U8V-EPDB]. Powders and
pills aren't their only scams. See, e.g., Rae Paoletta, NASA Calls Bullshit on Goop's $120
'Bio-Frequency Healing' Sticker Packs [Updated], GIZMODO (June 22, 2017, 9:20 AM),
https://gizmodo.com/nasa-calls-bullshit-on-goops-120-bio-frequency-healing-1796309360
[https://perma.cclVZ6K-TS69].
147.
Common FraudSchemes: Investment Fraud, supra note 139.
148.
E.g., Daniel M. T. Fessler et al., Political Orientation Predicts Credulity
RegardingPutative Hazards, 28 PSYCHOL. SCI. 651, 657-59 (2017); see also infra note 156.
149.
See supra Section II.A.
150.
See supra Section III.A.1.
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by persuading victims that a bad opportunity is in fact a good one;
if the opportunity were good, it wouldn't be a scam. Even though
advertising theory can paint an optimistic or a pessimistic portrait
of targeted advertising, with targeted scams only the pessimistic
version is plausible.
There is a significant objection to this reasoning, albeit an
unappetizing one. A scam might make its victim worse off, but it
does not follow that the scam itself is harmful; if it benefits the
scammer more than it harms the victim, then the scam might be
welfare-enhancing on the whole. This might occur, for instance, if
the scammer had a greater marginal utility of money than the
victim. Just as a starving thief stealing bread might increase social
welfare, a needier scammer taking from less-needy victims might,
overall, be a good thing.1 5 1 Such a scenario is unlikely to occur,
though, for at least two reasons. First, if a scam were to generate
more surplus for the scammer than it costs the victim, then the
scammer could simply pay the victim the difference and the
transaction would no longer be a scam. The transaction costs
between scammer and victim should, in most cases, be small, so
when this doesn't happen it suggests that the scam is probably not
welfare-enhancing. Second, the welfare consequences of a
hypothetical welfare-enhancing scam would need to consider
changes to potential victims' incentives and behavior, which could
be substantial. If, for example, people had to protect themselves
from scams, then those costs-which are pure waste-might dwarf
the net benefits to scammers because the universe of potential
victims is large. 152 Or, if potential victims forego opportunities or
experiences to avoid being scammed, then those lost opportunities
might outweigh any benefits to scammers. 153
The upshot, then, is that targeting makes scams more
efficient, and more-efficient scams are very likely to hurt society.
By compiling and productizing detailed profiles of individual

&

151.
Cf. Proverbs 6:30 ("People do not despise a thief if he steals to satisfy his hunger
when he is starving."); VICTOR HUGO, LES MIStRABLES 51-52 (Frederick Mynon Cooper ed.,
1862).
152.
See, e.g., Angelo Antoci et al., Self-Protection,PsychologicalExternalities, and the
Social Dynamics of Fear, 61 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 349, 351-53 (2017); Ann P. Bartel, An
Analysis of Firm Demand for ProtectionAgainst Crime, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 443, 478 (1975)
(discussing firm expenditures for protective measures); Isaac Ehrlich, Crime, Punishment,
and the Market for Offenses, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1996, at 43, 48-51; Isaac Ehrlich
Gary S. Becker, Market Insurance, Self-Insurance, and Self-Protection, 80 J. POL. ECON.
623, 640 (1972).
153.
See, e.g., W. David Allen, Self-Protection Against Crime Victimization: Theory and
Evidence from University Campuses, 32 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 21, 32 (2013) ('"[I]ndividuals
desire protection from crime, but protection comes at a cost,' and sometimes that cost takes
the form of foregone opportunities to enjoy social activity.").
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users, the Facebooks and Googles of the world-along with
literally thousands of tracking companies most people have never
heard of-make it easier for the Ian Haweses of the world to set
up new scams.
2. Better Hiding. In addition to making it easier for
scammers to target victims, data platforms like Facebook also
make it easier for them to evade detection by law-enforcement
officials and other authorities. These authority figures can play
two distinct roles when it comes to scams. In one role, the simple
presence of an authority figure can prevent a scam from operating,
much like the presence of a guard in a store might prevent a
robbery. In this role, better hiding changes the incidence of scams
by directly affecting one of the three things that must come
together for a scam to happen: the lack of a capable guardian. In
the other role, authority figures operating after-the-fact to detect,
prevent, and remediate scams-working more like detectives than
in-store security guards. This is less direct, shutting down
motivated scammers rather than preventing individual scams
from occurring. But it probably has a greater effect in the long run.
Targeting doesn't really affect the first role of authority
figures because that kind of authority mostly doesn't exist for
online transactions. With narrow exceptions-certain bank and
investment transactions, for instance-online transactions don't
generally have to be approved or monitored by any authority figure
before they happen. If someone gives money to the American
Horizons PAC or buys a worthless Super Male Vitality
supplement, the transaction happens without an opportunity for a
capable guardian to step in. 154 It matters very much, though, if
authority figures detect and shut down scams, because a scam that
operates for less time can ensnare fewer victims and because a
scam that is expected to ensnare fewer victims will appeal to fewer
scammers.
Targeting does affect the second role, however, making it
harder for authorities to detect scams by affecting each of the ways
that authorities might do so in the first place. There are three basic
means by which authorities can detect scams: reports by victims
and intended victims, reports by witnesses, and investigation by
the authorities themselves. Targeting makes each of these
154.
Though, online (and offline) stores increasingly use algorithms to block
transactions that they conclude have a high likelihood of being fraudulent. E.g., Khadeeja
Safdar, Why Paying for Fast Shipping Could Get You Flagged as a Fraudster,WALL ST. J.
(Apr. 19, 2018, 10:07 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-paying-for-fast-shipping-could
-get-you-flagged-as-a-fraudster-1524139200 [https://perma.cc/SA4Y-KLAH]. For more on
fraud-detection algorithms, see infra Section IV.A.

154

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[ 57:1

mechanisms less likely to work, whether the authorities are lawenforcement officials, journalists, public-interest groups, or other
third parties. This Section explains how targeting makes it easier
for scammers to evade detection through these three means.
Reports by Victims and Intended Victims. The easiest way to
detect a scam may be to wait for a victim, or intended victim who
doesn't fall for the scam, to report it once it happens. Someone who
gives money to a scam PAC, and later learns the truth, might
report the PAC to the Federal Election Commission or to a
campaign or reporter; someone who dials an expensive overseas
number in response to a Caller ID scam might see the bill and
report the scam to her phone company.
Waiting for victims to report scams is a low-cost method of
detection because it requires little up-front investmentessentially just setting up some way to process incoming reports.
It can, however, be an inefficient means of detection when victims
and intended victims are unlikely to report a given scam because
a scammer could victimize many people before law-enforcement
officials learn of the scam's existence. The likelihood that someone
will report a scam, therefore, matters greatly: if victims and
intended victims are likely to do so, then the scam can quickly be
shut down, but if they are unlikely to report a scam, then many
people could fall victim before someone takes the steps necessary
to report the scam. And this is a real problem because many scams
are under-reported.155
Targeting makes it less likely that victims and intended
victims will report a scam, for two major reasons. Targeting can
reduce the number of people exposed to a scam, even while keeping
constant the size of the scam or the amount of money it makes,
because it reduces the number of uninterested people who are
exposed to it. It can also change who sees the scam, causing it to
be seen by the potential victims who are least likely to believe it's
a scam. This lets scammers take advantage of their potential
victims' motivated reasoning, which tends to distort people's
thinking in favor of their preferred outcomes.1 5 6 As mentioned
above, this means that they are more likely to fall for it, but it also
means that they are less likely to report it. A get-rich-quick scam
155.
See supra Section III.A.2.
156.
See, e.g., Kari Edwards & Edward E. Smith, A Disconfirmation Bias in the
EvaluationofArguments, 71 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 5, 18-22 (1996); Ziva Kunda,
The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BuLL. 480, 493-95 (1990); David P.
Redlawsk et al., The Affective Tipping Point:Do Motivated Reasoners Ever "Get It'?, 31 POL.
PSYCHOL. 563, 564 (2010); Drew Westen et al., Neural Bases of Motivated Reasoning: An
fMRI Study of Emotional Constraints on PartisanPolitical Judgment in the 2004 U.S.
PresidentialElection, 18 J. COGNITiVE NEUROSCIENCE 1947, 1955 (2006).

2019]

DATA SCAMS

155

that targets people who want to become rich, or a fake cure that
targets people with an incurable disease, has an audience that
wants the scam to be true, and so will do the cognitive work to
believe it is true, all evidence to the contrary. This works best
when the viewer has an emotional stake in the issue-which is
precisely what scammers try to take advantage of.
The net effect, then, is that a targeted scam can be seen by
fewer people, and those that do see it can be more likely to believe
it and less likely to report it to authorities. The overall chances,
then, that anyone reports the scam can be much lower than they
would be for the same scam without targeting. Yet the scam can
make just as much money-or more-targeting a smaller
audience.
Reports by Witnesses. Witnesses who are not victims can also
report scams to authorities. Targeting should make it less likely
that a witness will report a scam, for many of the same reasons as
apply to victims and potential victims: there will be fewer
witnesses to a scam, and those witnesses who do exist may be less
likely to report.
The first point is straightforward. Witnesses can learn of a
scam in many ways, but the number of potential witnesses will
depend on how many potential victims the scammer targets,
because the more widely distributed information is about a scam
the more people will encounter that information. When a scammer
can target fewer people, there will be fewer potential witnesses.
The second point is subtler. Witnesses might be more likely or
less likely than victims to report scams. Unlike victims, they have
nothing at stake, and so may not care enough to report them, but
they may also be less likely to avoid reporting due to motivated
reasoning or embarrassment. Different witnesses, though, likely
have different propensities to report scams, and in addition to
changing the number of potential witnesses, targeting changes the
kinds of people who might become witnesses. While witnesses
might be less affected by motivated reasoning than a scam's
victims would be, they might still be affected. Because targeting
will tend to select similar people, there should often be similarities
between victims and witnesses. Many of the potential witnesses of
the American Horizons scam, for instance, are themselves likely
to be Trump supporters, because those are the people the ads
targeted and also the people most likely to know and associate
with the victims of the scam; likewise with scams targeting the
poor, the elderly, specific religious groups, immigrant populations,
and so forth. If witnesses share characteristics that cause victims
to believe a scammer, then the witnesses might likewise be
credulous of the scam and so less likely to report it.
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Independent Investigation. Even without a report from a
victim or witness, law-enforcement agencies and others can
uncover scams through their own independent investigation.
Many of these investigators will be government employees,
including those working in police departments or prosecutors'
offices or for agencies like the Federal Trade Commission,
Securities and Exchange Commission, or offices of state attorneys
general. Others could be journalists, nonprofit consumerprotection groups, academics, activists, or other interested
outsiders. Though most scams that come to investigators'
attention are likely reported, investigators can also uncover them
on their own. For instance, an agency might randomly send
undercover investigators into businesses to see if they act
honestly; 15 7 or it might perform statistical analyses on reported
data to detect patterns indicative of fraud.15 8
Targeting hinders this form of detection as well, because
investigators are more likely to come across a scam when
information about that scam is exposed to the public, but targeting
minimizes the amount of information so exposed. Keeping scams
hidden has often been a goal of scammers, but doing so can run
counter to the need to attract victims. Targeting lets a scammer
have it both ways: making the scam known to potential victims
while keeping it hidden from others. This isn't new-a scammer
who pitches retirees on an investment scheme would be dumb to
pitch those who don't fit the profile-but online targeting
automates this filtering process and lets it happen at scale.
Authorities might come across scams anyway, but targeting
means they're much less likely to do so on their own. Most
investigators aren't likely to be members of the groups targeted by
scammers, so they won't naturally see scam ads. They could
instead try to fake it-the online equivalent of undercover workbut doing so is unlikely to work without a lot of effort.
157.
See, e.g., Eric Lichtblau & William M. Arkin, More FederalAgencies Are Using
Undercover Operations, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/16/u
[https://perma.cc/T3VY-SP
s/more-federal-agencies-are-using-undercover-operations.htm
SY].
158.
The Securities and Exchange Commission, for instance, has an Analysis and
Detection Center that analyzes market activity, looking for signs of illegal insider trading.
See Reuters, Here's How the SEC Is Using Big Data to Catch Insider Trading, FORTUNE
(Nov. 1, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/11/01/sec-big-data-insider-trading/ [https://perma.cc
/3AZ9-PM4E]. Similarly, there are mathematical techniques to detect fraudulent
accounting results. Benford's Law, for instance, is the observation that the first digits of
numbers in real-world data often follow a logarithmic distribution, with 1 appearing more
often than 2, 2 more often than 3, and so forth. Financial data that fails to obey the law can
be a sign of fraud. See Cindy Durtschi et al., The Effective Use of Benford's Law to Assist in
DetectingFraud in Accounting Data, 5 J. FORENSIC AccT. 17, 19-22 (2004).
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Investigators could, for example, set up dummy profiles fitting
various groups that might be targeted by scammers. This requires
a lot of foresight, though, to identify the right groups; before the
American Horizons scam came to light, would many officials have
identified Trump supporters as potential victims? Moreover, it
would take a lot of work to maintain profiles for different potential
targets because targeting can draw from many sources of
information, like browsing history, retail transaction data, reading
habits, consumer surveys, and more. 15 9 An investigator could take
the easy route and just tell Google or Facebook that a dummy
profile is a member of a targeted group, but if they don't take the
time to engage in all the normal online activities that a real
member of that group would, then even a mildly sophisticated
tracking system won't target them alongside real potential
victims. It's like sending an undercover cop into a school to find a
drug dealer: the dealers will probably realize that something is up
when the new kid doesn't act like a typical student. 160
The net effect of targeting, then, should be to make it easier
for scammers to hide their activities and harder and more
expensive for authorities to detect them. This will matter to a
different degree depending on the scam because different kinds of
scams will require different kinds and amounts of detection. Some
scams will be illegal and cause a lot of harm, so authorities will
want to work hard to eliminate them and prosecute their
perpetrators; others will cause less harm and so be lower
priorities. With legal scams, policymakers might want to learn
what scams exist so they can change the law to eliminate them, or
they might conclude that the law should do nothing about a
particular scam, leaving detection to interested outsiders like
consumer-protection groups. Targeting should affect all these
kinds of investigation, hindering all of these goals.
3. Better Scams. The third way that targeting platforms
facilitate scams is by helping scammers develop and deploy better,
more-effective scams. Rather than changing the number of times
a motivated scammer, suitable target, and lack of a capable
guardian coincide, this changes the likelihood that when these
things come together, the scam will succeed. Targeting platforms
help scammers develop better scams in two ways: by giving
scammers the ability to quickly test and improve their scams and

See supra notes 54-62 and accompanying text.
159.
See, e.g., 22 JuMP STREET (Columbia Pictures & Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures
160.
2014). But see 21 JuMP STREET (Columbia Pictures & Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures
2012).
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by making it possible to run individualized versions of the scam
tailored to individual victims.
Testing and Improving Scams. The main benefit that
targeting platforms provide to advertisers is the ability to choose
who sees an ad, but another benefit is increasingly important: the
ability to figure out what that person should see in the first place.
Targeting platforms provide this benefit by making it possible to
test and compare hundreds or thousands of ads, or versions of an
ad, quickly and at scale. Tracking and testing are, conceptually,
unrelated services, but because both depend on many of the same
underlying technological requirements (quickly serving different
content to different users and recording those users' behavior and
outcomes) and serve the same goals (optimizing ad performance),
the two are often offered together or are designed to work
together. 16 1
Testing different ads to figure out what works best is
something that advertisers have always sought to do, but the tools
available for doing so have historically been limited by technology
because most ads can't be customized for individual readers and
viewers. To test a tv or magazine campaign, a company's best
options have usually been tools like focus groups or test
marketing-running different ad campaigns in Minneapolis and
Milwaukee, for instance, and seeing how they affected sales in
each market. Doing this is expensive and slow. Indeed, test
marketing is so expensive and time-consuming that it is mostly
used to test new products, not to test different ad campaigns for
the same product.1 62
The most flexible way to test ads before the internet was
probably direct mail because an advertiser could create different
versions of a mailer and see which ones got better results. This led
David Ogilvy, maybe the most accomplished advertiser of all time,
to call direct mail his "first love and secret weapon."1 63 With most
forms of advertising, it's hard to tell if a specific ad actually leads
161.
See supra notes 53-60 and accompanying text. Indeed, the two are so often
connected that they can sometimes be interchangeable. For instance, a few years after
Facebook acquired the Atlas ad-serving technology and business from Microsoft, the
company gave up on it as a major ad-serving platform and repurposed it for measurement
and analytics instead. See Allison Schiff, Facebook Shutters Atlas Ad Server, Ending Its
Assault on DoubleClick;Atlas to Live On as Measurement Pixel, ADEXCHANGER (Nov. 18,
2016, 11:00 AM), https://adexchanger.com/platforms/facebook-shutters-atlas-ad-server-end
ing-assault-doubleclick-atlas-live-measurement-pixell [https://perma.cclZ5KB-826T].
162.
See, e.g., N. D. Cadbury, When, Where, and How to Test Market, HARV. Bus. REV.
(May 1975), https://hbr.org/1975/05/when-where-and-how-to-test-market [https://perma.cc/
U7DE-DW3R].
163.
OGILVY, supra note 48, at 143.
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to any incremental sales, which is why the nineteenth-century
department-store magnate John Wanamaker (allegedly) said that
"I know half my advertising is wasted, I just don't know which
half." 16 Direct mail makes it possible to see these effects directly
through A/B testing-trying multiple options on random groups of
recipients to see which works better. Is it better, for instance, to
offer 56 issues of a magazine for $65 or 29 issues for $29.95? As
Ogilvy reported, though the latter brought in less revenue per
subscriber, it brought in far more new subscribers, and so 35%
more revenue. 165 Though there are inherent limits even to this
form of testing because it can be impractical and expensive to send
more than a few versions of a mailing while tracking the responses
in enough detail to draw meaningful conclusions.
The internet makes it much easier and quicker to do A/B
testing, 166 so much so that today it's a standard part of many online
companies' playbooks. 16 7 Google famously tests individual aspects
of its web design to see, for instance, which of forty-one shades of
blue got users to click more often-a level of micromanagement
168
that eventually drove away the company's first visual designer.
That example happened a decade ago, though, and things have
advanced quickly since then. In the political realm, for instance,

E.g., Catherine Tucker, The Implications of Improved Attribution and
164.
Measurabilityfor Antitrust and Privacy in Online Advertising Markets, 20 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 1025, 1026 (2013). Versions of the quotation have also been attributed to others,
including Henry Ford and Lord Leverhulme. See id. at 1026 n.6 (citing Torin Douglas,
Tough Sell for Britain'sMad Men?, BBC NEWS (Nov. 2, 2010), https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
uk-11674865 [https://perma.cclPL3Q-HAN6]).
OGILVY, supra note 48, at 144.
165.
I use the term A/B testing because it is the most commonly used term in industry,
166.
even though modern implementations routinely compare more than two options. There are
plenty of other names for the same thing. See, e.g., RON KOHAVI ET AL., PRACTICAL GUIDE
TO CONTROLLED EXPERIMENTS ON THE WEB: LISTEN TO YOUR CUSTOMERS NOT TO THE

HIPPO 959, 961 (2007), https://ai.stanford.edul-ronnyk/2007GuideControlledExperimen
ts.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q2EQ-YASL] ('The web provides an unprecedented opportunity to
evaluate ideas quickly using controlled experiments, also called randomized experiments
(single-factor or factorial designs), A/B tests (and their generalizations), split tests,
Control/Treatment tests, and parallel flights."). If you're curious, HiPPO stands for
"Highest Paid Person's Opinion." Id. at 959.
E.g., Brian Christian, The A/B Test: Inside the Technology That's Changing the
167.
Rules of Business, WIRED (Apr. 25, 2012, 8:47 PM), https://www.wired.com/2012/04/ff-abtes
ting/ [https://perma.cc/5FJL-EHTM].
See Douglas Bowman, Goodbye, Google, STOPDESIGN (Mar. 20, 2009), https://sto
168.
pdesign.comlarchive/2009/03/20/goodbye-google.html [https://perma.cc/J9B5-7TH8]; Laura
M. Holson, Puttinga Bolder Face on Google, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2009, SundayBusiness, at
1. Google does thousands of tests a year. See Jenna Hanington, The ABCs of A/B Testing,
SALESFORCE PARDOT (July 12, 2012), https://www.pardot.com/blog/abcs-ab-testing/
[https://perma.ccl76FD-U26M] (reporting that Google did more than 7,000 A/B tests in
2011).
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Barack Obama's presidential campaigns made extensive use of
A/B testing, comparing everything from different website splash
pages to different language asking contributors to save their
payment information for next time. "Now save your payment
information" worked 20-30% better than "Save your payment
details now to make the process quicker next time," and these
differences, in the aggregate, raised tens of millions of dollars. 1 69
The Trump campaign took this even further, testing as many as
175,000 different Facebook ads per day to see which ones worked
best. 170 That speed and scale would be simply impossible with
mailers, let alone tv or print advertising.
It's not a coincidence that all the examples in the last
paragraph are from large, well-funded companies and
organizations, but as with many products and services, the
technology underlying A/B testing is evolving from expensive
custom services to cheap commodity products. When Amazon did
A/B testing for every tweak of its homepage in the early 2000s or
when the Obama campaign did its testing in 2008, they basically
had to roll their own-creating both the content to test and the
infrastructure to test it.171 Since then, new tools have made it
easier to do both. The e-mail-marketing firm MailChimp, for
instance, now offers a tool to do A/B testing of e-mail subject lines,
"from" names, delivery dates and times, and content; 172 likewise,
after the Obama campaign ended in 2008, its head of analytics
cofounded Optimizely, a company that makes tools to test website

169.
David Moth, Seven Lessons Obama's Digital Team Learned from A/B Testing
Emails, ECONSULTANCY (Oct. 28, 2013), https://econsultancy.com/blog/63672-seven-lessons
-obama-s-digital-team-learned-from-a-b-testing-emails [https://perma.cclF6PT-7H69]; see
also Christian, supra note 167 (describing how Dan Siroker, previously a product manager
at Google, introduced A/B testing to Obama's 2008 campaign).
170.
See, e.g., Sarah Frier, Trump's Campaign Said It Was Better at Facebook.
Facebook Agrees, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 3, 2018, 6:32 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/ 2 018-04-03/trump-s-campaign-said-it-was-better-at-facebook-facebook-agrees
[htt
ps://perma.cc/QQ4W-K3VS] (reporting that, according to an internal Facebook white paper,
the Trump campaign ran 5.9 million different Facebook ads during the 2016 presidential
campaign, compared to the Clinton campaign's 66,000); Lapowsky, supra note 62 (reporting
that tests peaked at 175,000 ads on the day of the third presidential debate); Lesley Stahl,
Facebook "Embeds,"Russia and the Trump Campaign's Secret Weapon, CBS NEWS (Oct. 8,
2017), https://www.cbsnews.comnews/facebook-embeds-russia-and-the-trump-campaignssecret-weapon/ [https://perma.cclYR9S-LC8G] (reporting that the campaign tested an
average of 50,000 to 60,000 ads per day).
171.
See, e.g., KOHAVI ET AL., supra note 166, at 959; Dan Siroker, How Obama Raised
$60 Million by Running a Simple Experiment, OPTIMZELY BLOG (Nov. 29, 2010),
https:/Iblog.optimizely.com/2010/11/29/how-obama-raised-60-million-by-running-a-simpleexperiment/ [https://perma.cclUKL7-APS8].
172.
A/B Testing: See What Works Best, MAILCHIMP, https://mailchimp.com/features/
ab-testing/ [https://perma.ccN9CX-W5EP] (last visited Sept. 12, 2019).
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and mobile-app content. 173 When the Trump campaign did their
174
which
testing in 2016, they used Facebook's advertising API,
of
thousands
evaluate
and
run
to
infrastructure
the
them
gave
generate
to
system
a
build
to
different ads, but they still had
175
thousands of ad contenders and evaluate their results. Since the
election, though, Google, YouTube, and Facebook have launched
tools that let advertisers automatically generate and test different
versions of an ad. 176 Facebook's version, for instance, lets an
advertiser provide different ad assets-say, five banner images,
three titles, three sets of ad copy, and two links-and
automatically generate dozens of versions.1 77 A technique, then,
that just a few years ago was limited to large, tech-savvy
organizations is now available to any online advertiser-including
scammers.
This discussion has focused on advertising used to promote
scams, but the same story can be told about the rest of the scam
as well. Just like tools allowing advertisers to compare different
See Laurie Segall, Optimizely Aims to Give Obama 2012 a Data Edge, CNN
173.
MONEY (May 2, 2012, 5:24 PM), https://money.cnn.com/2012/04/23/technology/startups/op
timizely-election/ [https://perma.cc/6HQ9-A8EH]; Siroker, supranote 171. There are plenty
more where those came from. See, e.g., Jacob McMillen, The 20 Most Recommended AB
Testing Tools by Leading CRO Experts, CONVERSION SCI. (Sept. 16, 2016), https://conversio
nsciences.com/bloglab-testing-tools/ [https://perma.cc/Q6DV-ESCT].
API stands for application programming interface. An API is essentially a tool
174.
that allows third parties to write software to interact with a system. Facebook's advertising
API, for instance, lets advertisers write their own code to generate, test, and run ads,
without any Facebook employees having to be involved directly. Dynamic Creative,
FACEBOOK FOR DEVELOPERS, https://developers.facebook.comi/docs/marketing-apildynamiccreative/overview [https://perma.cc/94ER-59WQ] (last visited Sept. 12, 2019).
See, e.g., Sue Halpern, How He Used Facebook to Win, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, 59-60
175.
About
(2017) (book review). Facebook has an A/B testing tool, but it's pretty primitive. 1See
46 4
73
3098
8 6
Split Testing, FACEBOOK Bus., https://www.facebook.com/business/help/1
669 [https://perma.ccl35YF-93G7] (last updated Apr. 19, 2019). Facebook's only tool for
dynamically generated ad content is designed for showing different products to different
users from a catalog provided by the advertiser-not really the goal when a campaign is
trying to figure out which ads drive donations or votes.
See, e.g., Lauren Johnson, YouTube's Technology Can Now Spit out Thousands of
176.
Different Video Ads at Once, ADWEEK (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.adweek.com/digital/
youtubes-technology-can-now-spit-out-thousands-of-different-video-ads-at-once/ [https://pe
rma.cc/T2YE-R9L5]; Ginny Marvin, Google AdWords' Automated Ad Suggestions Test Is
Getting a Reboot, SEARCH ENGINE LAND (Sept. 5, 2017, 11:05 AM), https://searchenginela
924
2
[https://perma.cclKP52-VT
nd.com/google-adwords-automated-ad-suggestions-beta- 81
EH]; Ginny Marvin, Google's New Responsive Search Ads Can Show 3 Headlines, Longer
Descriptions, SEARCH ENGINE LAND (May 4, 2018, 11:40 AM), https://searchengineland.co
29 7 4 2
8 [https://perma
m/google-adwords-new-responsive-search-ads-can-show-3-headlinesGenerate up to 6,250
Can
.cc/7BWG-HW3G]; Tim Peterson, Facebook's Dynamic Creative
Versions ofan Ad, MARKETING LAND (Oct. 30, 2017, 8:30 AM), https://marketingland.comlfa
22 7 2
50 [htt
cebooks-dynamic-creative-option-can-automatically-produce-6250-versions-adps://perma.cc/5GEY-HF5R].
See Dynamic Creative, supranote 174; Peterson, supranote 176.
177.
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ads, tools to compare website and mobile-app content have become
cheap and easy to use. A motivated scammer, then, could test
different versions of a scam's landing page to see which one snags
the most victims-something that took the Obama campaign a lot
of effort in 2007 and 2008, but is now easy to do with off-the-shelf
components. Indeed, we may be approaching the point where the
comparison isn't even necessary, if an Al can just tell you the best
ad to begin with. 178
Individualized Scams. The final way that targeting platforms
make it easier to scam people is by making it possible to tailor
scams to individual victims. This is a culmination of the tracking
and testing techniques discussed in the rest of this Part: instead
of just using tracking tools to show ads to the most interested
audiences,1 7 9 or just using A/B testing to figure out which ads are
most effective, 180 why not combine them to show each interested
individual the version of the scam that would be most persuasive
to that individual victim? Classic A/B testing tells you which
option works best in the aggregate, but if you can figure out that
option A works better on some people while option B works better
on others, there's no reason not to make use of that information.
Just as large-scale tracking and testing are difficult or
impossible without the internet, large-scale individualized scams
are impossible to pull off without the sorts of tools provided by
tracking platforms. Indeed, they're far harder to pull off together
than tracking and testing are individually because the number of
variables in play is far higher. Instead of just analyzing, say, 200
user-specific variables to determine which users should see an ad,
or 200 ad-specific variables to determine which version of an ad
works best, a system would need to analyze how each of the 200
user-specific variables interacts with each of the 200 ad-specific
variables-40,000 combinations. The math is far more
complicated, and because search space grows exponentially with
the number of dimensions, ungodly amounts of data can be needed
to make reliable predictions. 181

178.
See, e.g., Emily Alford, How AI Could Make A/B Testing a Thing of the Past,
CLICKZ (Aug. 10, 2018), https://www.clickz.com/how-ai-could-make-a-b-testing-a-thing-ofthe-past/216302/ [https://perma.ccl77BV-4XRW].
179.
See supra Section III.B.1.
180.
See supra Section IH.B.3.
181.
This is all highly simplified. For more, see, for example, KEVIN P. MURPHY,
MACHINE LEARNING: A PROBABILISTIC PERSPECTIVE 1-25 (2012) (describing the scope and
basic requirements of machine learning, including the need for sufficient training data
across the search space of inputs and the curse of dimensionality, wherein that search space
increases exponentially with the number of dimensions).
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Even modern targeting systems, then, don't often target
individual users with individual versions of an ad. Advertisers
instead have had to do it manually, using the results of testing to
set up different campaigns when results indicate different ads
might be effective for different groups of users. In the last year or
two, though, tools like machine learning and especially deep
learning are starting to make it possible. Machine learning is a
182 but
broad term that encompasses many different techniques,
several of those approaches are well suited for the challenge
because they can deal with very-high-dimensional data. 183 A deep
neural network, for instance, can take data with hundreds or
thousands of dimensions, like the browsing behavior and personal
information about users and whether or not those users responded
to different ads, and boil it down to a small number of variables
that predict nearly all the variance.1 84 Using this technology to
predict which users are most likely to click on an ad is becoming
old hat.18 5 Combining it with individualized ads is in its infancy,
See, e.g., Brandon Wirtz, 8AI Technologies That Ain't NeuralNetworks, LINKEDIN
182.
(Jan. 28, 2018), https://www.inkedin.com/pulse/8-ai-technologies-aint-neural-networks-br
andon-wirtz/ [https://perma.cc/M4WL-MQZF].
See, e.g., JOHN D. KELLEHER ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF MACHINE LEARNING FOR
183.
PREDICTIVE DATA ANALYTICS: ALGORITHMS, WORKED EXAMPLES, AND CASE STUDIES 226-

37, 249-69 (2015) (describing how approaches like feature selection and Bayesian modeling
can get around the curse of dimensionality). This is a small sampling of approaches; for a
review of many more, see, for example, C.O.S. Sorzano et al., A Survey of Dimensionality
Reduction Techniques (arXiv, Working Paper No. 1403.2877v1, 2014), https://arxiv.org/pdfl
1403.2877 [https://perma.cc/L22P-K7VF]. For a nicely accessible lay explanation of the
problem, see Nikhil Buduma, The Curse of Dimensionalityand the Autoencoder, MUSINGS
MIT STUDENT (Mar. 10, 2015), http://nikhilbuduma.com/2015/03/10/the-curse-of-dimension
ality/ [https://perma.cc/492T-ZLSE].
See, e.g., Jilrgen Schmidhuber, Deep Learningin Neural Networks: An Overview,
184.
61 NEURAL NETWORKS 85, 94 (2015). For accessible lay explanations, see Nikhil Buduma,
A Deep Dive into RecurrentNeural Nets, MUSINGS MIT STUDENT (Jan. 11, 2015), http://nikh
ilbuduma.com/2015/01/1 1/a-deep-dive-into-recurrent-neural-networks/ [https://perma.ccfU
FW4-75H6]; Nikhil Buduma, Deep Learning in a Nutshell, MUSINGS MIT STUDENT (Dec.
29, 2014), http://nikhilbuduma.com/2014/12/29/deep-learning-in-a-nutshell/ [https://perm
a.cc/FHC3-TCNK).
See, e.g., Tom Simonite, Google and Microsoft Can Use Al to Extract Many More
185.
Ad Dollars from Our Clicks, WIRED (Aug. 31, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/stor
y/big-tech-can-use-ai-to-extract-many-more-ad-dollars-from-our-clicks/ (discussing Google
and Microsoft's use of deep learning to generate ad clicks) [https://perma.cc/7RZE-QBZJ];
Marty Swant, Snapchat Is Beginning to Use Machine Learning to Improve Ad Targeting,
ADWEEK (Dec. 30, 2016), https://www.adweek.com/digital/snapchat-beginning-use-machi
ne-learning-improve-ad-targeting-175330/ [https://perma.cc/ST77-RGMT] (explaining how
Snapchat uses machine learning for its API); Sridhar Ramaswamy, Powering Ads and
Analytics Innovations with Machine Learning, INSIDE ADWORDS (May 23, 2017), https://
adwords.googleblog.com/2017/05/powering-ads-and-analytics-innovations.html (describing
machine-learning-based tools to target customers who are actively in the market for a major
purchase and identify those who are closest to purchasing); Guorui Zhou et al., Deep Interest
Network for Click-Through Rate Prediction 2-5 (arXiv, Working Paper No. 1706.06978v4,
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but almost certain to grow quickly. 186 Soon, then, it will be trivial
for a scammer to show different ads to different potential victims,
each automatically optimized to ensnare that particular victim.
IV. INTERVENTIONS
If targeting platforms make it easier to commit scams and
harder to detect them, then counteracting these effects could pay
significant dividends for consumers. One naive approach would be
to ban targeting for these purposes, or even for all purposes.1 8 7 But
because targeting is so entrenched and, arguably, has so many
other legitimate uses, banning it is likely to be politically unviable
and enforcement would be difficult.1 8 8 Another naive approach
would be to invest more resources into investigation and detection.
This would quickly turn, though, into an expensive cat-and-mouse
game between scammers and investigators.1 89 Moreover, even if
these approaches could work, neither is well tailored to the unique
features of online targeting platforms.
A promising approach could instead be to use targeting to
fight the downsides of targeting: using the same tools that enable
targeted scams to detect and prevent them. The same targeting
technologies that make it possible to identify the most promising
potential victims, for instance, could provide new ways to detect
and block scams by revealing their own characteristic patterns.

2018), https://arxiv.orglabs/1706.06978 [https://perma.cc/ZM8V-N8NP] (reporting a deep
neural network used by the Chinese retailer Alibaba to predict click-through rates); Ruoxi
Wang et al., Deep & Cross Network for Ad Click Predictions4, 6 (arXiv, Working Paper No.
1708.05123v1, 2017), https://arxiv.org/abs/1708.05123 [https://perma.cc/D6BE-QBAW]
(similar use, but for Google).
186.
In July 2018, for instance, Google announced "responsive search ads," a new ad
format in which an advertiser provides different options for the ad's headline and
description and Google uses machine learning to predict which combination works best for
a given user making a given search query. See Jerry Dischler, Putting Machine Learning
into the Hands of Every Advertiser, GOOGLE (July 10, 2018), https:/Iblog.google/technology/a
ds/machine-learning-hands-advertisers/ [https://perma.cc/GQ8Q-JVQ9].
187.
See, e.g., David Dayen, Ban Targeted Advertising, NEW REPUBLIC (Apr. 10, 2018)
https://newrepublic.com/article/147887/ban-targeted-advertising-facebook-google [https://p
erma.cclAU4L-3S7C]; Harper Neidig, Lawmakers Roll out Bill to Protect Children from
Online Data Collection, HILL (May 23, 2018, 4:46 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/technology/
38 9 7 7
0 -lawmakers-push-bill-to-protect-children-from-online-data-collection
[https://perm
a.cc/FMC6-EL6F].
188.
See, e.g., Neidig, supra note 187 (noting that a bipartisan bill to ban targeted
advertising to children has been introduced "several times over the past decade, with little
success').
189.
See, e.g., Dan Turkel, Hackers Are Playing a 'Cat-and-Mouse Game' with the
IRS-and Doing an 'Amazingly'GoodJob at Stealing Your Tax Returns, BUS. INSIDER (Feb.
24, 2016, 6:49 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/the-irs-is-warning-of-increased-fraud
-phishing-attempts-this-tax-season-2016-2 [https://perma.cc/2BRY-GXNJ].
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This would, effectively, provide a new means of investigation and
detection specific to data scams. There are two basic ways these
tools could come about: platforms could make it possible for lawenforcement authorities to deploy and use these tools to stop
scams, or the platforms could do it themselves. Both approaches,
though, face substantial-maybe even disqualifying-obstacles.
A.

Using Technology to Detect and Prevent Scams

Because the problem of data scams is, at its root,
technological, one obvious approach is to look to technology for
solutions to that problem. There are reasons to think that the data
and targeting technologies that make targeting platforms possible
could help detect and prevent scams.
There are many ways technology might be used to detect and
prevent scams. Someone developing a scam-detection tool might
compare known scams to innocent behavior, for instance, and look
190 Or they might look for
for patterns that might indicate scams.
ways to identify especially gullible or vulnerable users and see who
is targeting those users. 191 Or they might look for short-term
advertisers that switch from account to account, or just subject
new advertisers to extra scrutiny.1 92 Or they might examine those
ads that gain popularity quickly. 193 The right tools and techniques
For example, Apple detected a violation of the iOS App Store's terms by the Uber
190.
app because the app was set up to behave differently when it was physically located at
Apple's headquarters. MVike Isaac, Uber's C.E.O. Plays with Fire, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/23/technology/travis-kalanick-pushes-uber-and-h
imself-to-the-precipice.html [https://perma.cc/6C7Q-GK5E]. This is behavior indicative of a
scam, because there's no good reason to behave differently at precisely the one location
where software is reviewed for approval to appear on Apple's App Store platform. It's also
the sort of thing that a platform could-and did-detect using its own analytics tools.
For example, some companies are now sending their employees fake phishing
191.
e-mails to see which employees click on them. When a user clicks on such an e-mail, they
get a page explaining the threat of phishing. See, e.g., Barbara Ortutay, Companies Send
Fake PhishingEmails to Test Security, PRESS HERALD (Feb. 12, 2015), https://www.presshe
[https://perm
rald.com/2015/02/12/companies-send-fake-phishing-emails-to-test-security/
could, if it
Facebook
or
Google
like
platform
advertising
an
Likewise,
a.cc/VWC2-Y8MWI.
wanted, post implausible fake ads and see who clicks on them; or they could look for other
indicators of gullibility, like buying nose-hair trimmers. See supra note 52 and

/

accompanying text.
For example, Facebook recently announced added scrutiny for political
192.
advertisers and users who run popular groups, requiring that their identities be verified
before they can advertise or post. Rob Goldman & Alex Himel, Making Ads and Pages More
4
Transparent,FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Apr. 6, 2018), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/0
a
for
harder
it
makes
This
transparent-ads-and-pagesl [https://perma.cc/4646-ZR5C].
scammer to account-hop-at least for a scam with a political element, like the American
Horizons scam-or to set up a scam group while hiding behind a fake identity.
Such a burst of popularity can be a sign that someone is paying a click farm to
193.
increase traffic artificially, for instance by reviewing a product or following a social-media
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will change quickly as scammers adapt and technology developsbut the same is true of the underlying targeting tools and
techniques.
Indeed, companies have demonstrated a remarkable ability to
detect scams using data and, especially, machine learning. Banks,
insurance companies, and other businesses have worked for
decades to identify fraudulent transactions. 1 9 4 More recently,
online stores and platforms have tried to do the same thing. Fraud
is especially problematic for online stores because thieves can use
orders to monetize stolen credit or debit cards, shipping goods to
mail drops or vacant addresses, and then collecting them for use
or resale. Once an item is shipped, there's no getting it back from
a thief, even though the store typically gives up the revenue on
fraudulent transactions due to credit-card chargebacks. Online
stores have strong reason, then, to predict fraudulent transactions
before they happen, and a vibrant industry has emerged of
companies with names like Riskified, Signifyd, and Accertify that
promise to make such predictions. 195
Some of the most interesting fraud-detection cases arise in
two-sided platform markets-platforms that act as intermediaries
bringing together both sides of a transaction, like eBay (buyers
and sellers) or Uber (drivers and passengers) or even dating
sites. 196 These platforms have to deal with customers on either side
trying to defraud the platform as well as customers trying to
defraud their counterparties. Uber estimates, for example, that
fraudulent trips make up as much as 10% of bookings when it
enters a market; with time, the company can bring that down to
"sustainable" levels of around 0.5%.197 (These frauds work in
account or clicking on an ad. See, e.g., Laura Stevens & Jon Emont, To Game Amazon,
Sellers Use Scams, Clicks & Dirty Tricks, WALL ST. J., July 28, 2018, at B1-B2; Vijaya
Gadde, Confidence in Follower Counts, TWITTER BLOG (July 11, 2018), https:/Iblog.twitter.
com/official/en us/topics/company/2018/Confidence-in-Follower-Counts.html [https://perm
a.cc/W5PW-AK6Y]; Charles C. Mann, How Click FraudCould Swallow the Internet, WIRED
(Jan. 1, 2006, 12:00 PM), https://www.wired.com/2006/01/fraud/ [https://perma.ce/44QAJLEY].
194.
See, e.g., Aisha Abdallah et al., FraudDetection System: A Survey, 68 J. NETWORK
& COMPUTER APPLICATIONS 90, 92-94 (2016); Richard J. Bolton & David J. Hand,
StatisticalFraudDetection:A Review, 17 STAT. SCI. 235, 237-45 (2002); E.W.T. Ngai et al.,
The Application of DataMining Techniques in FinancialFraudDetection: A Classification
Framework and an Academic Review of Literature, 50 DECISION SUPPORT SYS. 559, 562-64
(2011); Jarrod West & Maumita Bhattacharya, Intelligent FinancialFraud Detection: A
Comprehensive Review, 57 COMPUTERS & SECURITY 47, 50-56 (2016).
195.
See Safdar, supra note 154.
196.
See, e.g., Jennifer Levitz, Online Daters Are FallingPrey to Scams, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 1, 2016, at A3.
197.
One Driver Explains How He Is Helping to Rip off Uber in China, BLOOMBERG,
(June 28, 2015, 6:40 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-06-28/one-driver-
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various ways. Some drivers buy modified phones that can use
multiple SIM cards and phone numbers, so they can both request
a ride as a passenger and accept the ride as a driver from the same
phone.19 8 Sometimes these rides are billed to a stolen credit card,
but sometimes they're legitimately paid for, taking advantage of
new-customer bonuses that mean that Uber sometimes pays a
driver more than it charges a rider. 199 Some drivers add in GPSspoofing tools to go on "rides" that were never actually taken. 200
Uber has devoted substantial resources to detecting new forms of
fraud, looking for patterns like trips where the driver's phone
indicated a GPS altitude that would mean that the car was flying,
or trips where the car went substantially faster than other nearby
cars through crowded city streets, or users who spent more time
adding and deleting payment methods than comparing prices for
different levels of service. 201 This isn't foolproof because the line
between fraud and reasonable customer service can be fuzzy, 202
but instances like the flying cars are unambiguous. Once certain
trips have been classified as fraudulent, the company can use that
fact to learn more: instead of terminating a user committing fraud,
it has sometimes allowed it to continue for a time, building a
dataset of known-fraudulent trips that can be used to find new
patterns using machine learning. 20 3
The successes that companies have had in detecting fraud
suggests that using similar technologies might be able to use data
to detect scams. This would allow someone-maybe lawenforcement authorities, or maybe the platforms themselves-to
shut them down or even block them before they victimize anyone.

explains-how-he-is-helping-to-rip-off-uber-in-china [https://perma.cc/4TSD-CDF4].
198.
Id.
199.
Alistair Charlton, Uber Taken for a Ride by Scammer DriversEarningProfitfrom
Bogus Fares, INT'L Bus. TIMES (June 30, 2015, 12:36 PM), https://www.ibtimes.co.uk/ubertaken-ride-by-scammer-drivers-earning-profit-bogus-fares- 1508601 [https:/perma.ccl6BT
Y-ZV4K]; Alfred Ng, Uber Fights Off Scammers Every Day. Here's How It Learned the
Tricks, CNET (June 14, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/uber-fights-off-scamm
ers-every-day-heres-how-it-learned-the-tricks/.
200.
Ng, supra note 199.
201.
See, e.g., id.; Ting Chen, Advanced Technologies for Detecting and Preventing
Fraud at Uber, UBER ENGINEERING BLOG (Jan. 14, 2018), https://eng.uber.com/advancedtechnologies-detecting-preventing-fraud-uber/ [https://perma.cc/P3UB-ZU6D].
202.
See, e.g., Greg Bensinger, Uber Drivers Take Riders the Long Way-at Uber's
Expense, WALL ST. J., (Aug. 13, 2018, 6:44 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/uber-driv
ers-take-riders-the-long-wayat-ubers-expense-1534152602 [https://perma.cc/R5XC-R4EN]
(reporting a common scam in which Uber drivers take passengers on slightly-longer-thanoptimal routes-sometimes citing traffic or construction as an excuse-to take advantage
of Uber's pricing structure, under which passengers pay fixed prices but drivers are paid
according to a ride's distance and duration).
203.
Ng, supra note 199.
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The hard question, though, is who can and should develop and
deploy such tools.
B.

Giving Law-Enforcement Agencies Tools to Stop Scams

One obvious candidate to develop and deploy these scamdetection tools is the same group of law-enforcement authorities
that go after scams in the first place. There are reasons to think
these agencies would be well-suited to the task, but there are also
reasons to be skeptical of this approach. Law-enforcement
agencies might have strong incentives to detect and prevent
scams, both because that's part of their mission and because they
can obtain bureaucratic benefits from successes. They also have
domain expertise in frauds and scams, which might help develop
better scam-detection tools, and in investigations and the
criminal-justice system, which might help them know which
scams to prioritize and what to do once one has been detected. At
the same time, they may lack the expertise in platform
technologies, data analytics, machine learning, and other
technologies that might be critical to developing scam-detection
tools. There are occasional exceptions like the FBI's Operational
Technology Division, which develops and deploys precisely this
sort of investigative technology, but those exceptions are unlikely
to match the sheer volume of online communications and potential
scams. 204 Even when an agency does have skilled technical staff,
using a platform's tools can mean two layers of technical staff and
infrastructure, and so double the opportunities for something to go
wrong. A key challenge in implementing law-enforcement tools,
then, will be overcoming that lack of technical expertise.
There are many ways that agencies could structure scamdetection tools to look for targeted scams, requiring different
degrees of technical sophistication and cooperation from
platforms. At one end of the spectrum, an agency could just flag
known scams for platforms, providing hashes or search terms or
other indicators of suspicious behavior and asking platform
operators to block scams or refer them to the agency. Similar
techniques are already used to search for copyright infringement

See Operational Technology, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/services/operational-techn
204.
ology [https://perma.cc/MD47-NBQK] (last visited Sept. 12, 2019) ("The Operational
Technology Division (OTD) ... develops and deploys technology-based solutions to enable
and enhance the FBI's intelligence, national security, and law enforcement operations....
While OTD's work doesn't typically make the news, the fruits of its labor are evident in the
busted child pornography ring, the exposed computer hacker, the prevented bombing, the
averted terrorist plot, and the prosecuted corrupt official").
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and child pornography, 205 and these techniques could be expanded
to scams that agencies could readily identify and characterize in
unambiguous terms.
An intermediate method might be for a platform operator to
set up a portal through which agencies could see relevant platform
data in real time. Such a portal could provide, for instance,
running lists of the most commonly targeted demographics or the
most frequently clicked ads.2 0 6 This would give agencies a highlevel overview of activity on a platform without handing over
access to the underlying data; agencies could use this overview to
track trends and look for targeting that might indicate a scam.
The most aggressive approach might involve a platform
creating an API through which agencies could perform their own
analysis of targeting data. 2 07 This would let agencies develop their
own tools and do their own data analysis to find scams, leveraging
their expertise in frauds and scams. It might also allow agencies
to combine information they obtain using a platform's API with
information they have from other sources, which could help them
track down scammers who might otherwise escape attention.

On copyright, YouTube runs Content ID, a private system for tagging copyrighted
205.
works. See, e.g., How Content ID Works, YouTUBE HELP, https://support.google.comlyoutu
be/answer/2797370 [https://perma.cc/K43F-T5Q7] (last visited Sept. 12, 2019). On child
pornography, the National Center for Missing & Exploited Children (NCMEC) runs a
database of hashes of known images of child pornography, which online service providers
can use to scan for child pornography uploaded or transmitted by users. See, e.g., Sean
Gallagher, How Verizon Found Child Pornography in Its Cloud, ARS TECHNICA (Mar. 5,
2013, 10:51 AM), https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2013/03/how-verizon-fou
nd-a-child-pornographer-in-its-cloud/ [https:/perma.cclCMH2-44JT]. Under federal law,
service providers are obligated to report known instances of child pornography to NCMEC,
and both they and the NCMEC are immune from liability for doing so. See 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2258A-2258E (2012).
There are many such law-enforcement portals for many different purposes.
206.
Google, for instance, runs a portal called LERS, the Law Enforcement Request System,
through which agencies can request user information. Law Enforcement Request System,
GOOGLE, https://lers.google.com/ [https://perma.cclBJN5-9867] (last visited Sept. 12, 2019).
Other platforms have similar tools. There are also portals and databases used to track
stolen goods, like LeadsOnline, which lets agencies search eBay listings and sales,
transactions reported by pawn shops, and transactions involving ingredients and tools
needed to run a meth lab. See LeadsOnline:Services, LEADSONLINE, https://www.leadsonlin
e.com/main/services.php [https://perma.cc/8WGN-5DS4] (last visited Sept. 12, 2019). There
are also tools for agencies to get information needed to track down a suspect or serve a
subpoena, for instance based on a phone number. E.g., Numbering Data at Your Fingertips,
[https://perma.ccl3FW6-WDCV]
NPAC, https://lawenforcement.numberportability.com/
(last visited Sept. 12, 2019).
There is some overlap with the previous category. The Enhanced Law
207.
Enforcement Platform from the U.S. Number Portability Administration Center, for
instance, provides web and API access to information about a phone number. ELEP Service,
NPAC, https://lawenforcement.numberportability.comlservices/elep/ [https://perma.cclZ5S
T-FBUJ] (last visited Sept. 12, 2019).
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These are just some examples; plenty of other options are possible,
like query-based visualization or modeling software that could let
agencies investigate targeting without access to the underlying
data.
The most aggressive approaches provide the most power, but
they also would require giving agencies access to a tremendous
amount of information. The specifics of the toolset matter greatly
because different tools might give agencies wildly different views
of a platform's activity. Whatever the details, though, most of
these options would require some amount of cooperation from
platform operators. And it's far from clear that they would be
willing to cooperate: while platforms might be happy to let
agencies do the heavy lifting of detecting and preventing scams,
they also have reasons they might resist. For example, when
information leaked about PRISM, an NSA program to collect
information from platform companies, those companies disclaimed
knowledge of the collections and likely became less willing to
cooperate with government agencies in the future. 20 8 Likewise,
when the FBI demanded that Apple create a back door to unlock a
suspect's iPhone, it caused the company to dig in publicly and
explain why it fought a court order to do so. 2 09 When the
Department of Housing and Urban Development went after
Facebook for alleged housing discrimination, settlement
negotiations broke down, Facebook claimed, over HUD's demand
for access to Facebook user information. 2 10 Public criticism in 2016
led Twitter to ban law-enforcement use of the platform's API for
surveillance-of suspects or (per press reports) political protesters
-and to cut off third parties that helped agencies use it for this
purpose. 211 Platforms have not been reluctant to withhold access
208.
See Frederic Lardinois, Google, Facebook, Dropbox, Yahoo, Microsoft, Paltalk,
AOL and Apple Deny Participationin NSA PRISM Surveillance Program, TECH CRUNCH
(June 6, 2013), https:/techcrunch.com/2013/06/06/google-facebook-apple-deny-participatio
n-in-nsa-prism-program/ [https://perma.c/45F2-XZ6L].
209.
Tim Cook, A Message to Our Customers, APPLE (Feb. 16, 2016), https://www.appl
e.com/customer-letter/ [https://perma.cc/CFK2-GNFE].
210.
Russell Brandom, Facebook Has Been Charged with Housing Discriminationby
the US Government, VERGE (Mar. 28, 2019, 7:51 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/3/28/
18285178/facebook-hud-lawsuit-fair-housing-discrimination
[https://perma.cc/34AA-KCB
8].
211.
See, e.g., Kate Conger, Twitter Cuts DataminrAccess for Law Enforcement Fusion
Centers, TECH CRUNCH (Dec. 15, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/12/15/twitter-cutsdataminr-access-for-law-enforcement-fusion-centers/ [https://perma.cc/7B6N-EP6H]; Chris
Moody, Developer Policies to Protect People's Voices on Twitter, TWITER DEVELOPER BLOG
(Nov. 22, 2016), https://blog.twitter.com/developer/en-us/topics/community/2016/developerpolicies-to-protect-peoples-voices-on-twitter.html [https://perma.cc/QGZ5-SRQU]; Timothy
J. Seppala, Twitter Says No to Law Enforcement ProtestPolicing Tool, ENGADGET (Dec. 10,
2016), https://www.engadget.com/2016/12/10/twitter-says-no-to-law-enforcement-protestpolicing-tooll [https://perma.cc/6FVN-NP4V].
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to their information and APIs; when weighing the costs and
benefits of helping agencies fight scams, they might conclude that
the costs outweigh the benefits.
Platforms might be especially hesitant to cooperate with
agencies because anything that gives agencies access to user
information would create substantial privacy and civil-liberties
risks. Different scam-detection tools would have different
implications, but the common denominator is that some
information about a platform's users will wind up in agencies'
hands. If a social network creates an API that lets agencies
examine and process raw targeting information, for instance, that
might include information about users' photos, friend networks,
interests, posts and comments, and private chats-plus anything
the platform is able to infer about the user through her browsing
behavior, IP address, geolocation information, and so forth. Some
of this information will not be especially sensitive, but some of it
will be, and even seemingly nonsensitive information can reveal a
tremendous amount when considered in the aggregate.
These privacy issues could create legal problems for
platforms. Platform companies with competent lawyers will have
privacy policies that are broad enough to allow information
sharing with law-enforcement agencies, so under the dominant
notice-and-consent privacy regime in the United States, this kind
of sharing may be fine. A broad privacy policy wouldn't necessarily
immunize a company against all legal troubles, though; the FTC,
for instance, looks beyond fine-print policies to a company's
representations in its marketing and communications with
users. 2 12 Multinational companies would also have to consider how
cooperation would be treated by European regulators and courts
under the General Data Protection Regulation. 213 And a platform's
privacy policy does nothing for government agencies, which are
bound by constitutional and statutory privacy protections. The
Wiretap Act and Stored Communications Act, for instance, limit
the government's power to obtain electronic communications
without a court order or consent of the parties to the
communication. 2 14 Though obtaining information held by third

212.
See, e.g., Solove & Hartzog, supra note 88, at 629-30.
213.
In striking down the Safe Harbor agreement between the European Union and
the United States, for instance, the European Court of Justice concluded that nationalsecurity concerns were insufficient to trump the fundamental right to privacy. See Case C362/14, Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm'r, 2015, https://eur-lex.europa.eullegal-content/EN/TX
T/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62014CJ0362 [https://perma.cc/C77H-KVH6 ].
214.
Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2012); Stored Communications Act, 18
U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 (2012); see also Orin Kerr, The FCC'sBroadbandPrivacy Regulations
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parties usually does not infringe users' Fourth Amendment
rights, 2 15 the Supreme Court recently rejected the broadest
applications of this principle, 2 16 and one justice previously
suggested that a broader rethinking might be necessary. 217
These difficulties need not be fatal for agency efforts to detect
and prevent scams, but they limit the government's options. The
law could simply demand that platforms cooperate, though
defining the scope and capabilities of the required cooperation
would be difficult, especially given the speed with which platforms'
technical capabilities change. Gentler forms of encouragement are
more likely to work, but only when the benefits to a platform-in
avoiding controversy and regulatory scrutiny-outweigh the costs.
There are, however, many ways to shift these costs and benefits.
Agencies could look to build cooperative relationships with
platforms, implicitly dangling the carrot of a close relationship
with law enforcement or the stick of an antagonistic relationship.
Agencies could also offer more explicit benefits, like money or
purchases of a platform's products. If agencies have their own
technical expertise, they can offer this expertise and whatever
benefits come from technical cooperation; this might be especially
useful for smaller platforms. Still, platforms' broader business
concerns and public-relations concerns are likely to trump all but
the most substantial law-enforcement needs, so alternatives to
agencies may be needed.
C.

Giving TargetingPlatformsIncentives to Stop Scams

Instead of relying on law-enforcement agencies, targeting
platforms could go after scams directly. Platform operators could
be well positioned to do this because they have the technical
capabilities that agencies may lack. These efforts could also be on
firmer legal ground than law-enforcement efforts would be. They
face other difficulties, though: because platform operators make
money when their platforms are used to target people, they have
little incentive to shut down what could be whole categories of
customers. 218 One potential approach to solving the data-scam
Are Gone. But Don't ForgetAbout the WiretapAct, WASH. PoST (Apr. 6, 2017), http://wapo.st/
2oOXfAO.
215.
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742-45 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S.
435, 442-43 (1976).
216.
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219-20 (2018).
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417-18 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
217.
A similar dynamic has played out with YouTube's recommendation algorithm.
218.
The algorithm optimizes for increasing viewer engagement, but this turns out to reward
extremist videos and videos touting conspiracy theories and other deleterious content.
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problem, then, would be to increase operators' incentives to detect
and prevent scams that use their platforms.
If anyone can develop software tools to detect and prevent
data scams, it would include the same people that run targeting
platforms in the first place. Those developers are necessarily
familiar with the capabilities and architectures of their own
platforms, which gives them advantages in extending the
platforms to build new capabilities. They're also good at figuring
out the right variables to use for targeting and at finding patterns
in the data by using machine learning, running A/B tests and
experiments, and so forth. Moreover, although platforms lack the
native expertise in investigating frauds and scams, such
capabilities are probably easier to duplicate than technical
expertise because they are more widespread-there are many lawenforcement officers investigating many types of crime-and
because retired law-enforcement officers frequently join private
industry. 219 Extending targeting platforms to detect scams, then,
could be a plausible response to data scams.
At the same time, platforms have little incentive to exclude
whole categories of customers, for two reasons. The obvious reason
is that doing so would eliminate a source of revenue. This,
however, likely plays less of a role than it might seem, because the
sheer scale of platforms like Google or Facebook means that any
one market segment likely provides a negligible fraction of
revenue. Though, if the excluded category of customers is large,
then it could have an effect. In recent months, for instance, both
Twitter and Facebook saw their stock prices fall dramatically after
announcing slowdowns in user growth-in Twitter's case, after
revealing that it was deleting tens of millions of fake accounts per

YouTube has spent years trying to eliminate this problem, with little sign of major success.
The obvious easy solution would be to optimize for something different or get rid of the
recommendation algorithm, but the business downsides of that are large enough that
YouTube is apparently unwilling to do so. See, e.g., YouTube's Algorithm Keeps Suggesting
Extremist Content, NEW SCIENTIST, July 13-19, 2019, at 14; Craig Timberg et al., YouTube
Excels at Recommending Videos-but Not at Detecting Hoaxes, WASH. POST (Feb. 22, 2018),
http://wapo.st/2CDWYZB; Kelly Weill, How YouTube Built a Radicalization Machine for
the Far-Right, DAILY BEAST (Dec. 19, 2018, 10:32 AM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/howyoutube-pulled-these-men-down-a-vortex-of-far-right-hate [https://perma.cc/5SC4-S9A6].
219.
E.g., Occupational Separations and Openings, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT.,
https://www.bls.gov/emp/tables/occupational-separations-and-openings.htm
[https://perm
a.cc/8NE8-5DQX] (last modified June 24, 2019) (estimating that 4.1% of law-enforcement
workers would transfer occupations annually between 2016 and 2026); Jerri Williams,
Retired FBIAgents Make Great Second CareerHires: Why I Dyed My Hair Blue, LINKEDIN
(Dec. 11, 2015), https://www.1inkedin.com/pulse/retired-fbi-agents-make-great-second-care
er-hires-why-jerri-wiliams/ [https://perma.cc/P8RZ-CE22].
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month. 220 Moreover, blocking a controversial category of customers
can help avoid scrutiny from skeptical outsiders; this may be why
Google and Facebook have banned ads for controversial subjects
like payday lenders, bail bonds, cryptocurrencies, and unapproved
medicines. 22 1
The subtler reason platforms have little incentive to exclude
categories of customers is that blocking a category of ads isn't
automatic; it takes effort and engineering resources to enforce the
prohibition. Platforms operate on automation and scale, not
laborious individual enforcement. In the copyright context, Google
developed Content ID specifically to avoid manually processing
millions of copyright takedown demands. Likewise, search engines
strenuously fought the European "right to be forgotten" by arguing
(among other things) that they were not equipped to decide
whether pages should be de-indexed in individual cases. The Court
of Justice of the European Union rejected the argument, and now
search engines operating in Europe are forced to review individual
requests to remove search results that are "inadequate, irrelevant
or no longer relevant, or excessive in relation to those purposes [for
which they were collected or processed] and in the light of the time
that has elapsed." 2 2 2 A rule that banned scams would likewise

require substantial enforcement resources, both because such a
rule is unlikely to provide clear boundaries between permissible
and impermissible ads and because scammers are by their nature
willing to bend or break the rules. 22 3 Even if a platform tried to

avoid these problems by using machine learning or similar tools to
automate enforcement, it would need to continually update its
220.
See Emily Stewart, The $120-Billion Reason We Can't Expect Facebook to Police
Itself, Vox (July 28, 2018, 2:04 PM), https://www.vox.comlbusiness-and-finance/2018/7/28/
17625218/facebook-stock-price-twitter-earnings
[https://perma.cc/5KQX-MW7T];
Craig
Timberg & Elizabeth Dwoskin, Twitter Is Sweeping out Fake Accounts Like Never Before,
Putting User Growth at Risk, WASH. POST (July 6, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
technology/2018/07/06/twitter-is-sweeping-out-fake-accounts-like-never-before-putting-use
r-growth-risk/.

221.
See, e.g., David McCabe, Google, Facebook to Ban Bail Bond Ads, AXlOS (May 7,
2018), https://www.axios.com/google-bail-bonds-ads-ban-1525720613-6cde91b2-6938-4273ab86-e0211ee97292.htm1
[https://perma.ccl8XJS-E4DP]; Ian Wren, Google Follows
Facebook in Banning CryptocurrencyAds, NPR (Mar. 14, 2018, 3:24 PM), https://www.npr.
org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/03/14/593553255/google-follows-facebook-in-banning-cryptoc
urrency-ads [https://perma.cc/AP5L-YZ3E]; Andrea Peterson & Jonnelle Marte, Google to
Ban Payday Loan Advertisements, WASH. POST, (May 11, 2016), http://wapo.st/1T3dYOn.
222.
Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espafiola de Protecci6n de Datos,
2014, https://eur-lex.europa.eulegal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62012CJ0131&fro
m=EN [https://perma.cc/YU29-E68R].
223.
On the many difficulties in private governance of online platforms, see Kate
Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online Speech,
131 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1630-62 (2018).
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tools and algorithms as scammers found new loopholes and corner
cases.
Given these downsides to blocking scams, targeting platforms
are likely to take action on their own against scammers only when
it is clearly in their self-interest to do so. Just as when it comes to
cooperating with law-enforcement agencies, there are different
ways to tweak these incentives. The simplest approach, again,
would be to pay platforms directly to root out scams, but as always,
there are other approaches with different levels of aggressiveness.
An unaggressive approach might encourage platforms to educate
users about scams, imposing costs that would fall mostly on
platforms that fail to root out scams. 224 A slightly more aggressive
approach might involve regulators investigating scammers in
ways that impose indirect costs on platforms, perhaps by
subpoenaing records or calling executives to testify. A yet-moreaggressive approach would try to hurt platforms' other business
until they ban certain categories of advertising. Perhaps the most
aggressive option would be to hold companies civilly or criminally
liable for scams committed through their platforms. Regulators
have plenty of experience using all these tools against online
platforms in other contexts like sex trafficking, for good or for ill;
there is little reason they could not try to turn them to targeted
scams. 225
Efforts to encourage platforms to block scams have their
downsides. For one thing, even setting aside the problem of scale,
the challenge would be substantial, since blocking scammers isn't
trivial. The lines between scammer and legitimate advertiser can
be blurry, especially when that decision must be made by an
uninterested company with little reason to investigate the facts.
Errors will inevitably prevent some legitimate advertisers from
using a platform or permit some scammers to sneak through. The
biggest obstacles, though, may be legal, since provisions like the
Craigslist, for instance, posts warning messages at the top of its classified ads
224.
warning about common scams. It's possible, for what it's worth, that a warning message
wouldn't cost a platform operator money in the long run if it increases the platform's
trustworthiness and led users to rely more heavily on it. See, e.g., Avoiding Scams,
CRAIGSLIST, https://www.craigshst.org/about/scams [https://perma.cc/7NM9-AL4P] (last
visited Sept. 12, 2019).
See, e.g., Backpage.com, LLC v. Dart, 807 F.3d 229, 230-33 (7th Cir. 2015)
225.
(detailing Cook County Sheriff Tom Dart's extended efforts to kill Backpage.com's classified
ads for adult services). In 2018, Congress enacted new limits on § 230--discussed shortly
below-designed to make it easier to shut down websites that enable sex crimes. Allow
States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-164, 132
Stat. 1253 (2018). A few days before those limits went into effect, though, Backpage.com
was indicted and shut down under a preexisting, unrelated law. See, e.g., ERIC GOLDMAN,
INTERNET LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 303-10 (2018).
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First and Fourth Amendments and § 230 of the Communications
Decency Act make it hard or impossible for government to demand
cooperation from platforms. These legal constraints can
sometimes be overcome through legislation or clever argument,
but other times they reflect important policy objectives that cannot
or should not be overcome.
Section 230, in particular, would be a major obstacle to efforts
to force platforms to detect and prevent scams. Section 230 gives
online platforms broad immunity from liability for user-posted
content; with a few exceptions for things like intellectual property,
that liability insulates platforms not only from money damages for
distributing user-posted content, but also from prospective relief
like court orders to take down content. 226 It's easy to see why some
sort of immunity is necessary, since platforms could not operate at
scale if they had to police every user post. 2 2 7 The same is true for
advertising: platforms serve billions of ads every day, and asking
them to exercise due diligence over each of those ads would be
impossible. 2 28 Section 230 has been held, then, to apply even when
226.
47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012). For some of the most striking applications of § 230, see,
for example, Fields v. Twitter, Inc., 217 F. Supp. 3d 1116, 1120-29 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (holding
that Twitter could not be held liable for providing material support to terrorists for allowing
them to use its service), affd on other grounds, 881 F.3d 739 (2018); Jones v. Dirty World
Entm't Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 406-17 (6th Cir. 2014) (holding that the Dirty World
website could not be held liable for publishing allegedly defamatory gossip submitted by
users, even when it solicited the user submissions, refused to remove any, and added its
own commentary); Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169, 1173-77 (2009)
(holding that defendant could not be held liable for including plaintiffs product in a list of
alleged malware); Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 418-22 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding that
MySpace could not be held liable for negligence when it allegedly failed to take reasonable
precautions to prevent sexual predators from using the site to prey on minors); Blumenthal
v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 49-53 (D.D.C. 1998) (holding that AOL, which licensed and
republished Matt Drudge's gossip column, could not be held liable for defamation allegedly
contained in the column); Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330-34 (4th Cir. 1997)
(holding that AOL could not be liable for defamation when it repeatedly promised to delete
posts falsely accusing Zeran of selling offensive shirts about the Oklahoma City bombing,
but failed to do so); see also Eric Goldman, The Ten Most Important Section 230 Rulings, 20
TuL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 2-9 (2017) (discussing how cases involving § 230 have
built such an immunity); Eric Goldman & Jeff Kosseff, Commemorating the 20th
Anniversary of Internet Law's Most ImportantJudicialDecision,RECORDER, (Nov. 10, 2017,
4:00 AM), https://www.law.com/therecorder/sites/therecorder/2017/11/10/commemoratingthe-20th-anniversary-of-internet-laws-most-important-judicial-decisioi/
[https://perma.cc/
R4WL-E9PW] (listing a collection of essays regarding the seminal case, Zeran v. AOL).
227.
See, e.g., JEFF KOSSEFF, THE TWENTY-SIX WORDS THAT CREATED THE INTERNET
60 (2019); Roger Allan Ford, How the Supreme Court Ignored the Lesson of 'Zeran'and

Screwed up Copyright Law on the Internet, RECORDER, (Nov. 10, 2017, 12:45 AM) https://
www.law.com/therecorder/sites/therecorder/2017/1 1/10/how-the-supreme-court-ignored-th
e-lesson-of-zeran-and-screwed-up-copyright-law-on-the-internet/
[https://perma.cc/U5E9-

WZX5].
228.

See, e.g., Pamela Parker, GoogleBringing in More Than $100 Million Per Day Via

Ad Words, SEARCH ENGINE LAND (Oct. 25, 2012, 1:55 PM), https://searchengineland.com/goo
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platforms serve allegedly fraudulent ads, 229 and similar reasoning
would apply to any government effort to get platforms to detect or
prevent scams.
Amending § 230 would overcome the legal problem, but
designing an effective amendment would be difficult. It would
need to encourage platforms to develop and deploy scam-detection
tools without punishing them for mistakes or failures if those tools
don't catch every scam. 230 One option would be a regime that holds
platforms liable only when they have actual notice of a scam. The
similar notice-and-takedown provision in copyright law, though,
has mostly failed. 231 It has failed to reduce the amount of
2 32
infringing material distributed on the internet. It has also led to
the removal of noninfringing material, since platforms have
mostly set up systems to automatically remove content when they
get a notice of an alleged infringement, without evaluating the
merits of the complaint. 233 Maybe overinclusion wouldn't be a
substantial downside when it comes to ads, but many businesses
are so dependent on online platforms and advertising that even
small changes in Google's search algorithm can make or break
them, so reducing the reliability of online advertising could have
substantial downsides. 234
Despite these difficulties, encouraging platforms to detect and
prevent scams could be a plausible option. Between the technical
obstacles to law-enforcement detection efforts and the legal
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229.
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See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Rationalizing Internet Safe Harbors, J. TELECOMM.
230.
HIGH TECH. L., Fall 2007, at 101, 110-18 (discussing the benefits and challenges of various
internet safe harbors with regard to amending § 230).
See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012).
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233.
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VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 695, 698, 712-14 (2011) (arguing that the DMCA "has proven to
be remarkably scalable for enforcing copyrights in hosted content but has altogether failed
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Internet, FAST COMPANY (May 21, 2014), https://www.fastcompany.com/3030848/what-goog
le-search-algorithm-changes-do-to-the-internet [https://perma.cc/R5RN-LW3E].

178

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[57:1

obstacles to platform efforts, the legal obstacles are likely easier to
overcome. 235 Platforms may be wary of handing over user
information to law-enforcement agencies or giving agencies
powers that they could abuse, but they also don't want their
platforms to be overrun by scams. They might be susceptible, then,
to soft-power efforts to encourage them to develop and deploy
scam-detection tools.
But the incentive problems are real. Remember Uber's fairly
successful efforts to detect scams that rip off the company,
discussed above? 236 UYer is just as heavily plagued by scams that
rip off passengers-yet the company has seemingly done much less
to combat them. 2 3 7 The difference is obvious: One set of scams
harms the company directly, while the other just harms
customers. Even if the latter winds up hurting the company's
image or customer satisfaction, the effect is indirect and
ambiguous, and so much easier to ignore. Likewise, it is much
easier for targeting platforms to ignore scams that rip off their
customers compared to those that rip off the platforms.
V.

IMPLICATIONS

The problem of data scams is one with its roots in aggregated
personal information, but it is not a classic privacy problem.
Nothing about scammers' use of targeting platforms leads to any
235.
Though not trivial. For more on the difficulties of using financial incentives to
encourage platforms to police user behavior see Annemarie Bridy, Internet Payment
Blockades, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1523, 1554-67 (2015); Jake Linford, Response, PrivateOrdering
Under Threat of Regulation, 67 FLA. L. REV. F. 298, 301-12 (2016).
236.
See supra notes 196-203 and accompanying text.
237.
The latest example is "vomit fraud," which occurs when a driver falsely reports to
Uber that a passenger vomited in the car and Uber charges the passenger a clean-up fee.
See, e.g., Catalina Ruiz Parra, It's Called Vomit Fraud.And It Could Make Your Uber Trip
Really Expensive, MIAMI HERALD (July 22, 2018, 8:40 AM), https://www.miamiherald.com/
news/business/article215299675.html. Passengers frequently report that it takes many emails to get Uber to reverse the charge, or that Uber refuses to do so. Id. This isn't the only
scam drivers pull on passengers. For others, see for example, Angelina Aucello, I Was
Victim of an Increasingly-PopularUber Scam, ANGELINA TRAVELS (July 13, 2015), https://
angelinatravels.boardingarea.com/2015/07/13/i-was-victim-of-an-increasingly-popular-ube
r-scaml [https://perma.cc/G5J9-8XN5] (describing a scam in which a driver falsely told Uber
there were too many passengers in the car, causing the company to upgrade the fare from
Uber X to the more-expensive Uber XL); Samuel Gibbs, Uber's 'Ghost Drivers' Scaring
Passengersout of Rides and Money, GUARDIAN (Sept. 22, 2016, 11:51 AM), https://www.the
guardian.com/technology/2016/sep/22/uber-ghost-drivers-zombie-profile-pictures [https://p
erma.cc/7U3T-VDL9] (describing a scam in which a driver uses a disturbing profile photo,
hoping to scare off passengers and pocket cancelation fees). Blog posts and friendly
journalistic features describing Uber's sophisticated efforts to eliminate these scams are
rather scarcer than with the scams targeting Uber itself. For example, a Google search of
the matter returns only one journalistic feature relating to Uber's efforts. See also Ng, supra
note 199 (discussing the efforts Uber has made using machine-learning tools to reduce
scams on the platform).
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of the classic privacy losses: no information about targeted
consumers or scam victims is necessarily revealed to scammers or
the public. In some cases, information is revealed-for instance,
when a user clicked on the "Dinner with Trump" ad and
contributed to the American Horizons PAC, the PAC got the
contributor's name, employment information, and so forth as
required by federal election law-but it's also possible that a scam
might not reveal anything. A scam that installed malware on a
user's computer to mine bitcoins or send spam e-mails, for
instance, or that spread false information or sold digital
downloads, might not reveal any personal information.
This feature of data scams is not unique. Instead, they may
represent an instance of a broader phenomenon of nonprivacy
problems that nevertheless stem from the mass aggregation of
personal information. By compiling personal information into
large datasets and making it easy and cheap to use that
information for targeting, platforms create a set of structural
externalities, casting doubt on the social benefits of targeting
platforms. While some of these effects have been recognized by
scholars and policy makers, others have not; nor has that
recognition changed the basic view that targeting platforms
represent a tradeoff between efficiency and privacy. These
externalities fall into two broad categories: effects on the consumer
marketplace and effects on the democratic system.
The Consumer Marketplace. Targeting platforms affect the
marketplace by giving advertisers and sellers information about
individual consumers, which has two basic effects. First, it
changes the bargaining positions of consumers and producers by
reducing the information asymmetry between them or even
creating new asymmetries in favor of producers. When a producer
knows that a particular consumer is loyal to a particular brand,
for instance, it can use that information to charge a higher price;
when a producer knows that a consumer is focused on a particular
feature, it can highlight that feature. Even when transactions
represent voluntary, arms-length exchanges between rational
actors, then, the effect of targeting is to boost producers'
bargaining power through tools like price discrimination. This
may not necessarily be a bad thing-the economics of price
discrimination are complicated, though there are reasons to think
that it often creates wealth 2 38-but it undoubtedly changes how
See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single
238.
Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. 397, 426-42 (2009); Barry Nalebuff, Response,
PriceDiscriminationand Welfare, 5 COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L 221, 229-30 (2009). For just
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consumer and producer surplus are distributed, effecting a
systematic wealth transfer from consumers to producers.
Moreover, since producers are likely wealthier to begin with, this
should be expected to increase wealth inequality. That won't
matter to some, but it matters for adherents to metrics of social
welfare that go beyond pure utilitarianism.
Second, targeting also makes it easier for sellers to engage in
transactions that might not represent voluntary, arms-length
exchanges between rational actors. Scams are an example of this,
but there are other ways that sellers can take advantage of data
and targeting to conduct what Ryan Calo calls "digital market
manipulation." 239 By using targeting platforms to identify
individual cognitive biases specific to different people, for instance,
a seller might know exactly how to persuade someone to buy the
most profitable item in a category. Maybe someone is more willing
to overpay or buy pointless goods in the afternoon, taking a break
at work. Maybe they're more willing to do so on Tuesdays in May
and July, for reasons no one can explain.2 40 Regardless, this
information can be exploited. Companies have always tried to
identify and exploit cognitive biases, but it is far more powerful if
they can identify each person's individual biases, further shifting
the relative bargaining power of consumers and producers. 24 1
The Democratic System. Targeting platforms also affect the
democratic process in ways that scholars and policy makers are
increasingly grappling with. Much has been reported about ways
that Russia used Facebook and Twitter to affect the 2016
presidential election, 2 42 but it goes beyond that. More basic
a few of the foundational works in the literature, see generally, for example, LouIs PHLIPS,
THE ECoNOMICS OF PRICE DISCRIMINATION (1983) (offering a theoretical and unified
explanation of how prices are determined in practice); GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF
PRICE 210-13 (4th ed. 1987) (providing an overview of the varieties of monopoly pricing);
JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 133-34 (1988) (describing the

modern theory of monopoly and intertemporal price discrimination); Hal R. Varian, Price
Discrimination, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 597 (Richard Schmalensee

& Robert D. Willig eds., 1989) (providing an overview of the theory of price discrimination
and its applications).
239.
See Calo, supra note 6, at 995, 1003-18.
240.
Cf. Chris Anderson, The End of Theory: The Data Deluge Makes the Scientific
Method Obsolete, WIRED (June 23, 2008, 12:00 PM), https://www.wired.com/2008/06/pbtheory/ [https://perma.cc/9CNH-QNLK].
241.
See Calo, supra note 6, at 1007-12. This "mass production of bias" is just one of
three mechanisms of manipulation that Calo discusses. See id. at 1003-18.
242.
See, e.g., Tony Romm & Kurt Wagner, Facebook Says 126 Million People in the
U.S. May Have Seen Posts Produced by Russian-Government-BackedAgents, Vox (Oct. 30,
2017, 6:00 PM), https://www.recode.net/2017/10/30/16571598/read-full-testimony-facebooktwitter-google-congress-russiaelection-fake-news
[https://perma.cc/S4ZD-Y62Z];
Tony
Romm, 10 Million People Saw Russian Ads on Facebook Around the 2016 Presidential

2019]

DATA SCAMS

181

questions of democratic legitimacy and accountability arise when
candidates use targeting platforms. 2 4 3 Democratic legitimacy
depends on voters being informed about the policies supported by
candidates for elected office and having the opportunity to
deliberate about those policies and ratify them through fair and
free elections. 244 Targeting lets candidates present different
versions of themselves to different voters-up to and including
different positions on the same issue. 245 When this happens, have
voters meaningfully ratified the positions later taken by the
officeholder? This problem doesn't necessarily go away when one
has taken office; elected officials have also learned the value of
telling different people different things about what they're doing
in office. 246 If they work-a prospect that seems increasingly likely
in an era of eroding trust in the news media 24 7-then such ads
would help avoid accountability even for one's core campaign
positions.
The existence of these externalities suggests that the case for
regulating-maybe even banning-targeting platforms and
technologies is stronger than it seems. Regulation is most readily
justified when it addresses a market failure, and externalities are
Election, Vox (Oct. 2, 2017, 6:43 PM), https://www.recode.net/2017/10/2/16405900/russian[https:/perma.cclJJ
advertisements-facebook-2016-us-presidential-election-trump-clinton
C9-DLF2]; Scott Shane, To Sway Vote, Russia Used Army of Fake Americans, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 8, 2017, at Al, Al0-All; see also Dipayan Ghosh & Ben Scott, Russia's Election
Interference is DigitalMarketing 101, ATLANTIC (Feb. 19, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.
con/international/archive/2018/02/russia-trump-election-facebook-twitter-advertising/553
676/ [https://perma.cc/X9DX-6SEM] (discussing the unchecked market power of social
media with regard to Russia's meddling in the U.S. election).
See, e.g., HERSH, supra note 54, at 205-13.
243.
See, e.g., Robert Post, Commentary, Regulating Election Speech Under the First
244.
Amendment, 77 TEx. L. REV. 1837, 1841-42 (1999); Seyla Benhabib, Toward a Deliberative
Model of Democratic Legitimacy, in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE: CONTESTING THE
BOUNDARIES OF THE POLITICAL 67, 69 (Seyla Benhabib ed., 1996); Joshua A. Cohen,
Deliberationand Democratic Legitimacy, in THE GOOD POLITY: NORMATIVE ANALYSIS OF
THE STATE 17, 18-19 (Alan Hamlin & Philip Pettit eds., 1989).
See, e.g., ELI PARISER, THE FILTER BUBBLE: How THE NEW PERSONALIZED WEB IS
245.
CHANGING WHAT WE READ AND How WE THINK 152-56 (2012).

See, e.g., Craig Silverman, Trump Is Using Targeted Facebook Ads to Reassure
246.
Supporters He Will Build the Border Wall, BuzzFEED NEWS (Sept. 20, 2017, 9:10 AM),
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/craigsilvermanitrump-is-using-targeted-facebook-a
ds-to-reassure-supporters [https://perma.ce/P84P-2SRF] (reporting that President Trump
ran "dark" Facebook ads, targeted at supporters and invisible to others, "to reassure
supporters ... after his recent public comments caused many to question whether he would
keep his promise" to build a wall along the southern border of the United States).
See, e.g., American Views: Trust, Media and Democracy, KNIGHT FOUND. (Jan. 15,
247.
https://knightfoundation.org/reports/american-views-trust-media-and-democracy
2018),
[https://perma.cc/6EWH-3RF3] (reporting, based on survey results, that "Americans'
perceptions of the news media are generally negative, and their perceptions of bias have
grown considerably from a generation ago").
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a classic example. 248 Platforms are able to monetize targeting
without incurring all of its costs because these effects on the
consumer marketplace and the democratic system are felt by the
broader public. 249 If a targeting platform systematically
impoverishes consumers or harms democracy, well, that's not the
platform's problem. Yet, at least in the United States, targeting
platforms are essentially unregulated. The major exception is the
FTC's settlement-driven body of law defining deceptive and unfair
trade practices, 250 but the Commission hasn't applied that law to
the basic practice of targeted advertising.
Maybe it should. Under the FTC Act, an unfair trade practice
is one that "causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to
consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers
themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to
consumers or to competition." 2 5 1 This is not an unreasonable
description of these systemic effects of targeting platforms, even
setting aside the political effects. Targeting injures consumers
when it facilitates manipulation, enables scams, and reduces
consumers' bargaining power. Though there are countervailing
benefits to consumers, like funding free content or providing them
relevant information about products and services, it is far from
clear that these benefits are large enough to offset the costs.
Advertising funded free content well before targeting platforms
were possible, so the real question is not whether targeted
advertising funds free content, but what the size of the
incremental improvement is-and there are reasons to think it is
small. 2 5 2 So the naive solution of just banning targeted advertising
may have more to recommend it than it seems. 2 53
Still, targeting probably isn't going anywhere anytime soon.
In a world of second-best solutions, then, it is probably slightly
easier to overcome platforms' incentive problems than to overcome
agencies' expertise problems, so giving platform operators
incentives to structure their platforms to make it easier to detect
and prevent scams could be a useful intervention. Scams are not,
however, a problem that is likely amenable to a single cure-all.

248.

See, e.g., THOMAS A. LAMBERT, How TO REGULATE: A GUIDE FOR POLICYMAKERS

22-59 (2017).
249.
It's possible that unusually high-profile platforms like Facebook and Google do
bear some of these costs, since many of the ads they serve are seen on their own pages and
since privacy problems on each platform have been well covered by the press. Other, lessfamous platforms should bear few or none of these costs.
250.
See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 88; supra notes 84-98 and accompanying text.
251.
15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2012).
252.
See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
253.
See supra notes 187-88 and accompanying text.
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Different approaches-better incentives for platforms, better tools
for agencies, and more resources for investigating and prosecuting
scammers-may need to be combined.
VI. CONCLUSION

Platforms like Google and Facebook make it easier and
cheaper to target customers, but they also make it easier and
cheaper to scam those customers. Platforms facilitate these data
scams by making three things easier for scammers: finding the
most promising victims, hiding from authorities, and developing
the most effective scams. As more and more social behavior moves
online, the result could be that vulnerable individuals and groups
are increasingly victimized by malicious actors.
Data scams are a problem rooted in technology, which means
they may be amenable to a technological solution. One such
solution would be to use the same analytics tools that enable
targeting in the first place to detect and prevent scams, though
efforts to encourage platforms and law-enforcement agencies to do
so would have to overcome significant difficulties. Still, targeting
isn't going anywhere anytime soon, so giving operators incentives
to structure their platforms to make it easier to detect and prevent
scams may be a promising solution.
At the same time, data scams are a curious phenomenon
because they stem from the mass aggregation of personal
information and yet lead to harms that are not classic privacy
harms. They are not unique in this way; instead, they may
represent a broader class of ways that data aggregation can hurt
the consumer marketplace and democratic system. If so, then more
aggressive solutions, like regulation or even a targeting ban, may
need further consideration.

